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904 
Article 
On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility 
and Tax Policy 
Sarah B. Lawsky† 
 Remember that all models are wrong; the practical question 
is how wrong do they have to be to not be useful. 
—George E.P. Box & Norman R. Draper1 
  INTRODUCTION   
The assumption of declining marginal utility of income—
that the next dollar a person receives is “worth less”2 to a 
wealthy person than a poor person—has been crucial in tax 
scholarship over the last sixty or so years, as optimal tax theory 
and welfarism have become important ways that many in the 
legal academy evaluate tax policy.3 In spite of, or perhaps be-
cause of, the importance of this assumption, declining marginal 
utility has received little extended attention from the legal 
academy.4 This Article begins to fill that gap. 
 
†  Acting Professor of Law (Tenure Track), University of California, Ir-
vine, School of Law. Thanks to Amy Andrews, Charles Barzun, Joshua Blank, 
Donald Braman, Neil Buchanan, Linda R. Cohen, Elizabeth Emens, Michael 
Gilbert, Brandon Garrett, Risa Goluboff, Thomas Griffith, Ellen Lawsky, Mat-
thew Lister, Ruth Mason, John Setear, Rip Verkerke, Ethan Yale, and George 
Yin, and participants in the 2009 Junior Tax Scholars Workshop, the 2009 
Loyola–Los Angeles Law School Tax Policy Colloquium, and the 2009–2010 
University of Virginia School of Law Faculty Workshop for helpful conversa-
tions and comments on earlier drafts, and thanks to John Roper at the Arthur 
J. Morris Law Library at the University of Virginia for his outstanding re-
search assistance. Copyright © 2011 by Sarah B. Lawsky. 
 1. GEORGE E.P. BOX & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-
BUILDING AND RESPONSE SURFACES 74 (1987). 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 39–42 (discussing what it means 
for a dollar to be “worth” a certain amount). 
 3. See infra Part I.A.  
 4. Important exceptions include Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxa-
tion and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1363 (2004), and Edward J. McCaffery, 
Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 71. 
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Optimal tax theory, which attempts to balance distribu-
tional concerns and efficiency considerations, incorporates a 
welfarist approach to redistribution.5 Welfarism resolves dis-
tributional questions by maximizing social welfare, where so-
cial welfare is determined by aggregating individuals’ welfare 
in some way. Welfarist analysis often assumes that everyone 
experiences income as having declining marginal utility, that 
the next dollar is always “worth more” to a poorer person than 
to a wealthier person. If income does have declining marginal 
utility, a welfarist who does not explicitly incorporate equality 
into her analysis (for example, a utilitarian, who sums individ-
uals’ welfare to arrive at total social welfare) will, given certain 
other simplifying assumptions,6 conclude that the government 
should take dollars away from rich people and give them to 
poor people.7 Declining marginal utility is thus a key assump-
tion underlying the welfarist approach to tax law. 
The legal academy is not unaware that declining marginal 
utility is open to question. In 1952, Walter J. Blum and Harry 
Kalven, Jr., questioned declining marginal utility in their sem-
inal article The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation,8 in 
 
 5. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS 35 (2008) (“Optimal income tax analysis employs the standard 
welfare economic approach to policy assessment.”). 
 6. Most crucially, everyone must have the same utility curve. See Sarah 
B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1017, 1024–26 (2009). For a discussion of the various assumptions that 
are usually incorporated into a welfarist analysis, see discussion infra text ac-
companying notes 28–33.  
 7. See infra Part I.B.  
 8. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive 
Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952). The article was later expanded into a 
book, WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR 
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953). Blum and Kalven do not explicitly discuss 
welfarism. Rather, they discuss two justifications for progressive taxation that 
depend on declining marginal utility: proportionate sacrifice and minimum 
sacrifice. Proportionate sacrifice holds that each taxpayer should be required 
to pay in tax an equal percentage of his utility. Blum & Kalven, supra, at 455–
61. For most, but not all, situations in which income has declining marginal 
utility, this principle of proportionate sacrifice leads to progressive taxation. 
Id. at 459. Minimum sacrifice is essentially utilitarianism and holds that the 
law should bring about the greatest good for the most people, and thus gov-
ernment should impose taxes to “keep to a minimum the aggregate sacrifice 
imposed on the community as a whole.” Id. at 466; see also id. at 470 (noting 
that the minimum sacrifice principle, as an adaptation of utilitarianism, “has 
been subjected to serious criticism and is hardly fashionable today [i.e., the 
mid-1900s]. The crux of the criticism has been that it reduces ethics and polit-
ical science to accounting and that it does not discriminate sufficiently as to 
the quality of desires or satisfactions.”). Thus, if income has declining marginal 
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which they argued that declining marginal utility of income 
could be established only through “sheer intuition.”9 A few ar-
ticles have taken issue with Blum and Kalven’s view of declin-
ing marginal utility.10 With one notable exception, however, 
these articles do not point to actual evidence.11 Rather, they re-
spond to Blum and Kalven in kind, with purely theoretical ar-
guments or arguments that rely on intuition.12 
Aside from this fairly small line of scholarship, most tax 
legal scholarship simply assumes that marginal utility de-
clines.13 Indeed, many articles reach policy recommendations 
that depend (to a greater or lesser extent) on the assumption of 
declining marginal utility, without seriously engaging the ques-
tion of whether individuals actually experience declining mar-
ginal utility.14 For example, in an article defending an ideal 
 
utility, the minimum sacrifice principle always involves transferring money from 
those who are wealthier (and for whom the next dollar has less utility) to those 
who are less wealthy (for whom the next dollar has more utility). Id. at 467. 
 9. Blum & Kalven, supra note 8, at 477; see also discussion infra Part I.C. 
 10. See, e.g., Mark S. Stein, Diminishing Marginal Utility of Income and 
Progressive Taxation: A Critique of The Uneasy Case, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 373 
(1992) (“Typically, Blum and Kalven distort the argument for [diminishing 
marginal utility of income], thus obscuring both the force of the argument and 
the inadequacy of their response.”). See generally discussion infra Part I.C. 
 11. The exception is Griffith, supra note 4, which uses happiness surveys 
to obtain information about utility curves. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 12. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 13. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and 
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1649 (2000) (“It 
is widely accepted that redistributive income taxation can be justified by con-
siderations of vertical equity and the declining marginal utility of income.”); 
Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A 
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1947 (1987) (intro-
ducing optimal tax models into the legal literature and noting that such mod-
els “assume that consumption and leisure have declining marginal utility,” 
and that “[t]he assumption that the value of an additional dollar to an indi-
vidual declines as the number of dollars he owns increases (‘declining margin-
al utility’) is common in economic analysis”); James R. Repetti, Democracy and 
Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1137–38 
(2008) (stating that “[one] justification for progressive rates under the benefits 
theory might be based on the declining marginal utility of money” and noting 
the conclusions that flow “if we assume declining marginal utility”); Stephen 
Utz, Ability to Pay, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 867, 894 (2002) (“Perhaps the most 
popular assumption concerning . . . tax rates and the value of money to people 
is that the marginal utility of money income is not constant but diminishes.”); 
Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper Moreland, Can the Graduated Income Tax Survive 
Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX L. REV. 51, 52–53 (1999) (noting that in optim-
al tax analysis, “consumption [is] assumed to have declining marginal utility”). 
 14. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The 
Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 58 (2006) (“Greater in-
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consumption tax, Joseph Bankman and David Weisbach ex-
plain why they assume declining marginal utility: “[Declining 
marginal utility] may not be true in every case. Some wealthy 
people may crave additional wealth more than the poor. But 
given that we must make some assumption about utility, an 
assumption of declining marginal utility . . . seems to be an un-
problematic assumption.”15 
The assumption of declining marginal utility is, however, 
far from “unproblematic.” Rather, as this Article shows, while 
some empirical evidence supports declining marginal utility, 
other evidence also suggests that certain individuals actually 
 
come smoothing is desirable not simply because of risk aversion and the de-
clining marginal utility of money, but also because it can reduce adjustment 
costs associated with economic instability and offset failures in insurance 
markets.”); Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 TAX LAW. 549, 574 
(2008) (arguing that “most consumers-taxpayers can reasonably be assumed to 
have convex preferences,” which means that “the marginal utility of purchas-
ing some good or service that generates a public benefit will diminish as the 
amount of that good or service purchased increases,” and that “the govern-
ment can most cost-effectively induce its desired behavior by offering the mar-
ginal incentive at as low a rate as possible to as broad a group as possible”); 
Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal Deductions—A Tax “Ideal” or Just Another “Deal”?, 
2002 LAW REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 1, 22 (stating that it is “reasonable” to 
assume that “once the need for an amount equal to the cost of subsistence has 
been satisfied, the value or ‘utility’ of additional dollars earned will decline,” 
because commodities have declining marginal utility, and “there seems to be 
no reason why the same phenomenon would not occur when money is accumu-
lated. . . . A progressive or graduated rate reflects the differences in marginal 
utility of dollars of income to persons with different amounts of income.”); Eric 
A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1781, 1802 (2000) (assuming “a utilitarian social function and declining mar-
ginal utility of income” to model tax compliance); Deborah H. Schenk & And-
rew L. Grossman, The Failure of Tax Incentives for Education, 61 TAX L. REV. 
295, 345 n.184 (2008) (“The diminishing marginal utility of income . . . makes 
it unlikely that a poverty line taxpayer would be able to save at all.”); Daniel 
Shaviro, The Long-Term U.S. Fiscal Gap: Is the Main Problem Generational 
Inequity?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1298, 1319 (2009) (adopting a utilitarian ap-
proach, and stating that “[i]f people and their circumstances are assumed to be 
identical in all respects except for material wellbeing, the [declining marginal 
utility] assumption does all the work and suggests redistributing solely from 
richer to poorer individuals,” though also acknowledging that our lack of 
knowledge about the future makes intergenerational distribution questions 
particularly difficult to answer); David Kamin, Note, What Is a Progressive 
Tax Change? Unmasking Hidden Values in Distributional Debates, 83 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 241, 274 (2008) (proposing a measure for progressivity that depends in 
part on the declining marginal utility of income, noting that “it seems reason-
able to assume that a person’s expected marginal utility of income declines as 
her income rises”). 
 15. Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal 
Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1421 & 
n.13 (2006). 
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experience increasing marginal utility, at least over some range 
of income.  
The implications of such findings for tax policy and schol-
arship are profound. The U.S. income tax was shaped by the 
assumption of declining marginal utility. For example, early 
congressional debates over progressive taxation included vari-
ous references, implicit and explicit, to declining marginal utili-
ty.16 And various economists who were crucial in shaping the 
modern income tax also relied on declining marginal utility to 
argue for progressive taxes.17 
But if some people experience increasing marginal utility 
of income, a welfarist analysis that does not give explicit weight 
to equality will conclude that the tax system should redistri-
bute not only from the rich to the poor, but also from certain 
less wealthy people to certain wealthier people. A welfarist who 
is uncomfortable with poor-to-rich redistribution can resolve 
this dilemma in various ways, one of which is to acknowledge 
that declining marginal utility is a normative judgment, not a 
fact about the world. This Article is thus part of a line of ar-
ticles that make explicit and rigorously examine various as-
sumptions crucial to the optimal tax approach to tax legal 
scholarship.18 
 
 16. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 57, 61. 
 17. Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: 
Progressive-Era Economists and the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. In-
come Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793, 1851–54 (2005) (describing the importance 
of “marginalism,” that is, the idea that “each additional unit of a commodity, 
including money, was believed to be of lesser value than the previous unit,” to 
turn-of-the-century economists, and generally describing the impact that these 
economists, especially Edwin Seligman, had on the creation of the modern  
income tax). 
 18. See, e.g., Lawsky, supra note 6 (examining the assumption that ra-
tional individuals weight possible outcomes by the probabilities of those out-
comes, and analyzing the implications for tax law of a subjectivist interpreta-
tion of probabilities); Chris William Sanchirico, A Critical Look at the 
Economic Argument for Taxing Only Labor Income, TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1353322 
(arguing against the claim that any tax on labor and savings can be replaced 
by a superior tax on labor only by focusing on the assumptions underlying that 
argument); Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Ra-
tionale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001) (elaborating upon the argument in 
his earlier work, Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as In-
struments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 799–800 
(2000) [hereinafter Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules]); Sanchirico, Taxes 
Versus Legal Rules, supra at 799–800 (arguing that the result of the formal 
modeling laid out in Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is 
Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL 
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This Article does not, of course, suggest that the only prob-
lem, or even the only epistemological problem, with a welfarist 
analysis is that the marginal utility of income may or may not 
actually decline. As scholars have long recognized, there are 
many other possible problems. Individuals’ marginal utility 
may decline at different rates.19 It may not be possible to com-
pare individuals’ utility.20 Indeed, it may not be possible to 
measure utility at all.21 But these problems are distinct from 
(although of course related to) the declining marginal utility 
question. This Article, therefore, begins by assuming that indi-
viduals’ utility curves are identical. Further, it assumes that it 
is possible to measure an individual’s utility, and that it is 
possible to compare utility interpersonally.  
Part I of this Article looks at where tax law scholarship 
stands now. This Part sketches out the current dominance of 
the welfarist position, and then defines declining marginal util-
ity and examines the policy implications of, and evidence for, 
declining marginal utility. Part II presents evidence that some 
 
STUD. 667 (1994), “follows from an implicit assumption that all agents are 
identical with respect to the tort system”); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-
Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REV. 745, 750 (2007) (contending 
that arguments for a consumption tax rely on, inter alia, the assumptions that 
markets are complete and that people have stable preferences and are rational 
actors, and noting that “[r]eality is simply too messy for overly definite real 
world conclusions about the relative merits of [a consumption tax and an in-
come tax] to hold outside the contours of stylized and simplified models”). 
More generally, see Reza Dibadj, Weasel Numbers, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1325 
(2006), in which he argues that “traditional law and economics deeply misun-
derstands modern advances in welfare economics” and that “these advances 
point to the need for a robust administrative state”; Robert B. Ahdieh, Beyond 
Individualism in Law and Economics (Dec. 5, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1518836, wherein he argues that as-
sumptions of individualized rationality fail to consider the limiting effects of 
social norms and other outside factors and explaining how these can shape 
one’s understanding of law and economics; and the joke in which an economist 
solves the problem of being stranded on a desert island with a box full of 
canned goods by assuming a can opener. 
 19. See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, The Case for Progressive Taxation and 
the Case Against the Use of Utility Theory in Tax Scholarship (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 20. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS 
OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 39–52 (2006) (discussing and proposing possible 
solutions to the problem of interpersonal comparisons); Blum & Kalven, supra 
note 8, at 476 (citing Lionel Robbins’s work to support the proposition that “it 
is not possible to make the necessary interpersonal comparisons”). 
 21. The usual partial solution to this problem is to take an ordinal, rather 
than a cardinal, approach to utility. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 20, 
at 43–45 (discussing Kahneman’s approach to interpersonal comparisons, fo-
cusing on experiences and relating them to ordinal values). 
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people actually have increasing marginal utility, at least for 
some range of wealth.22 Part III looks at implications of in-
creasing marginal utility for tax policy and tax legal scholar-
ship. 
I.  THE STATUS QUO: WELFARISM AND DECLINING 
MARGINAL UTILITY   
This Part first describes the welfarist approach to distribu-
tive justice and then defines declining marginal utility, ex-
amines evidence for declining marginal utility, and looks at the 
implications of declining marginal utility to a welfarist analysis 
of tax policy. 
A. WELFARISM 
For the last few decades, with few exceptions, tax law 
scholarship has taken a welfarist approach to distributive jus-
tice. Welfarism holds that redistribution is desirable only if it 
improves overall social welfare,23 as it is defined below.24 Tax 
policies’ redistributive effects are thus judged by whether they 
improve social welfare, and proposals for new tax policies with-
in the legal academy have largely come from creative thinking 
 
 22. Specifically, this Part presents evidence for the Friedman-Savage util-
ity curve, so called because it was first proposed in Milton Friedman & L.J. 
Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279 
(1948). See generally infra Part II. 
 23. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to 
Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967, 973 (1999) (“In philosophy and con-
stitutional law, liberalism occupies center stage. . . . But when it comes to tax-
es and transfers, liberal principles of distributive justice give way to utilitarian 
talk of costs and benefits, incentives and disincentives.”); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive Taxation, 111 
YALE L.J. 1391, 1414–15 (2002) (“It is fair to say that since the 1950s, and 
even more so since the 1980s, academic legal writing on taxation has been 
dominated by efficiency issues and by the optimal tax approach. . . . Most of 
the writing on distributive issues [by legal tax academics, especially in some of 
the elite law schools,] has been done within the confining framework of optim-
al tax theory.”); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Sub-
sidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 529–31 
(2010) (noting that recent discussions about the charitable deduction have 
emphasized efficiency over distributive justice); Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Equity 
Versus Efficiency and the U.S. Tax System in Historical Perspective, in TAX 
JUSTICE 25, 25 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002); David 
A. Weisbach, What Does Happiness Research Tell Us About Taxation?, 37 J. 
LEGAL STUD. S293, S296 (2008) (referring to the optimal tax approach as the 
“now standard approach to taxation”). 
 24. See infra text accompanying notes 38–39. 
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about welfarism-based models.25 A few scholars have argued 
that more attention should be paid to a liberal or deontological 
approach, an approach that focuses on fairness, or equality, or 
freedom, or individualism.26 But these scholars have been in 
the distinct minority.27 This Part describes the currently domi-
nant welfarist approach. 
“[T]here are two steps to the welfarist analysis: a welfarist 
first determines individuals’ utilities, and, . . . second, aggre-
gates those utilities in some way.”28 But prior to these steps, a 
welfarist must first define utility (or welfare, or well-being).29 
Some take the position that well-being is equivalent to happi-
ness, or subjective well-being.30 Others equate well-being with 
preference satisfaction, whether actual preferences or “laun-
dered” preferences (that is, preferences for things that in-
formed, rational individuals acting only out of self-interest 
 
 25. See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: De-
ceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569 
(2006) (proposing a new penalty structure based on economic theory, but not-
ing uncertainty about the economic assumption of rationality). 
 26. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 23, at 973 (proposing a liberal argument 
against employment subsidies and stating that “positive economics is enorm-
ously useful in analyzing the effects of tax policies. But on the normative side, 
utilitarian talk necessarily omits core liberal values of individualism, freedom, 
and equality”); Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1415 (“It is time for legal tax aca-
demics to redress the balance [between equity and efficiency]. Efficiency issues 
cannot be neglected. . . . But issues of equity and ‘tax justice’ must be explicitly 
addressed as well.”); Fleischer, supra note 23, at 507–08 (arguing that recent 
work about the charitable deductions is incomplete because it “ignores or ex-
plicitly disavows normative distributive justice concerns,” focusing instead on 
efficiency). 
 27. A middle road, advocated by Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, is “weak 
welfarism,” which takes welfare into account, but also gives weight to other 
moral considerations. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 20, at 39–52. 
 28. A version of this argument was presented in Sarah Lawsky, Why  
Declining Marginial Utility Matters, PRAWFSBLOG (DEC. 7, 2009, 10:15 AM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/12/why-declining-marginal-utility 
-matters.html. 
 29. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 20, at 28–35 (outlining three 
common definitions of utility); Mark Kelman, Hedonic Psychology and the 
Ambiguities of “Welfare,” 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 391, 393 (2005) (describing the 
“basic ongoing conceptual problems that beset welfarism,” including how one 
defines welfare). 
 30. See, e.g., RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW 
SCIENCE 3–9 (2005) (proposing happiness as a goal); John Bronsteen et al., 
Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 1586 (2010) (“A person’s well-being is 
the aggregate of how she feels throughout her life.”); Griffith, supra note 4, at 
1368–71 (using happiness surveys to obtain information about utility curves); 
Richard Layard et al., The Marginal Utility of Income, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1846, 
1848 (2008) (defining utility as happiness).  
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would prefer).31 Still others believe welfare to consist in the sat-
isfaction of certain “capacities,” or objective goods, so that socie-
ty should work toward providing all citizens with, for example, 
bodily integrity, bodily health, and other specifically enumer-
ated goods.32 Most economists and many law professors accept 
the preference-satisfaction definition of utility, though some re-
cent articles have revived the happiness approach.33 As this Ar-
ticle explains, one’s definition of utility is key for determining 
whether people uniformly experience declining marginal utility 
of money. 
Utility, however it is defined, is a function of various facts 
about an individual and, possibly, the world in which he lives. 
Economic models often assume that a person’s utility depends 
only on the amount of his consumption and leisure, respective-
ly. Some models take an even more composite approach and 
consider utility to be determined entirely by consumption,34 but 
almost anything can be incorporated into a utility function, in-
 
 31. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 20, at 35–39 (advocating a “re-
stricted preference-based view of well-being,” which “stipulates that an out-
come benefits a person if she has an appropriately ‘restricted’ preference for 
that outcome—a preference that survives idealization and concerns her own 
interests”); KAPLOW, supra note 5, at 360 (noting that many “argue that social 
welfare should be assessed by reference to individuals’ rational, fully informed 
preferences when they conflict with revealed preference. What is desirable for 
individuals should be understood ‘supposing the desirer to possess a perfect 
forecast, emotional as well as intellectual, of the state of attainment or frui-
tion.’”); Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 37 J. LEG. STUD. S253, S254 (2008) (“An individual’s well-being is 
determined by the satisfaction of her preferences—more precisely, by the at-
tainment of those items that well-informed, rational, self-interested individu-
als would generally prefer.”). 
 32. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, 
NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 69–81 (2006) (proposing a “capabilities 
approach”). See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000). The capabilities ap-
proach may be better understood as an alternative to welfarism, rather than a 
definition of well-being. Compare KAPLOW, supra note 5, at 367 (“In consider-
ing the subject of redistribution, some economists and philosophers would not 
assess individuals’ situations by reference to well-being [but rather by refer-
ence to] capabilities and functionings.”), with ADLER & POSNER, supra note 20, 
at 35–39 (“Traditionally, theorists of welfare have [defined welfare] in three 
different ways, offering mental-state accounts of welfare, objective-good ac-
counts, or preference-based accounts.”), and KAPLOW, supra note 5, at 369 
(“Primary goods or capabilities may best be understood as ways of gauging 
well-being rather than as substitute concepts.”).  
 33. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 30. 
 34. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Concavity of Utility, Concavity of Welfare, and 
Redistribution of Income, 17 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 25, 26 (2003) (“[T]he utility 
functions . . . are taken to depend on each individual’s disposable income.”). 
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cluding a taste for fairness.35 The key point is that utility, how-
ever one defines it, is a fact about the world. Once utility is de-
fined, people have a certain level of utility, whether one can 
measure that level or not.36 
An individual’s utility can be represented by what is 
known as a “utility curve.” Utility curves map utility as a func-
tion of the amount of a particular commodity. For the purposes 
of this Article, the commodity is income. For example, Figure 1 
represents someone who gets one unit of utility—commonly 
called a “util”—from each additional dollar.37 
After determining individuals’ utilities, the welfarist ag-
gregates these utilities to arrive at total social welfare. While 
individual utilities are facts about the world, a social welfare 
function is a normative judgment. Social welfare functions can 
capture a variety of normative views. A utilitarian approach by 
definition weights each individual’s utility equally and sums 
individual utilities to arrive at overall social welfare. But a wel-
 
 35. See, e.g., Michael B. Dorff & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, The Perils of 
Forgetting Fairness, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 599 (2009) (“Fairness counts 
as a preference.”); Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Au-
dited Taxpayers, 41 CONN. L. REV. 161, 191–94 (2008) (incorporating fairness 
into a welfarist model). 
 36. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 34, at 26 (“The degree of [utility] . . . is an 
empirical question . . . .”); Harry Markowitz, The Utility of Wealth, 60 J. POL. 
ECON. 151, 158 n.11 (1952) (noting, in the context of discussing a particular 
utility function, that “[w]e seek a hypothesis to explain behavior, not a moral 
principle by which to judge behavior”). 
 37. This would be the utility function U(w) = w. 
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farist might also choose a different social welfare function. A 
completely egalitarian social welfare function, for example, 
would require complete equality of welfare. A moderately egali-
tarian social welfare function would weight the utility of the 
less well-off more than the utility of the more well-off, because, 
all else being equal, such a function would recommend redistri-
bution from the better-off person to the worse-off person.38 For 
example, imagine a society comprising only two people: Penny, 
who is poor, and Rich, who is rich. Assume as well that Penny’s 
next dollar would increase her utility by two utils, and Rich’s 
last dollar increased his utility by two utils. A social welfare 
function that weighted Penny’s utility twice as much as Rich’s 
would require transferring a dollar from Rich to Penny, be-
cause giving Penny a dollar increases overall societal welfare 
by four utils (twice Penny’s increase in utility), while taking a 
dollar from Rich decreases overall welfare by only two utils. 
Tax legal scholarship sometimes explicitly adopts or assumes a 
utilitarian social welfare function,39 but more often does not 
specify a social welfare function. Whether the social welfare 
function is explicit or implicit, however, it remains a normative 
judgment. 
A welfarist approach also usually incorporates the ideas of 
rational actors and expected utility.40 To rationally maximize 
utility under this approach, a person determines the expected 
utility of an action by considering the utility of each possible 
outcome of an action, weighting the utility of each outcome by 
the probability of its occurrence, and summing the weighted 
utilities.41 For example, imagine a game in which a person gets 
$1 if a coin flip turns up heads, but has to pay $1 if the coin flip 
turns up tails. The expected value of playing that game is zero 
dollars: $1 multiplied by the chance of getting heads (fifty per-
 
 38. See KAPLOW, supra note 5, at 44–50 (discussing various social welfare 
functions). 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 370–90 (arguing that social welfare is “a function of in-
dividuals’ utilities”); Griffith, supra note 4, at 1364 (“How much . . . does redis-
tributing income . . . increase total happiness . . . ?”); Posner, supra note 14, at 
1811–13 (proposing the most efficient way to collect taxes); Shaviro, supra 
note 14, at 1319 (using a “utilitarian assessment of generational equity”). 
 40. Cf. Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Inequality and Un-
certainty: Theory and Legal Applications, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 292–94 
(2006) (listing various assumptions usually made by welfarists, and noting 
that they adopt these assumptions because they “facilitate [the] analysis and 
. . . demonstrate that the complex issues described in [the] Article arise within 
mainstream social welfare analysis”). 
 41. See Lawsky, supra note 6, at 1024–26 (describing expected utility).  
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cent), minus $1 multiplied by the chance of getting tails (fifty 
percent).42 So the expected utility of the game is the utility of 
zero dollars, that is, zero. 
This Article accepts welfarism’s basic approach and as-
sumptions, as described in this section. In addition to these as-
sumptions, however, tax legal scholarship that incorporates a 
welfarist approach overwhelmingly assumes that individuals 
experience declining marginal utility of income.43 It is to this 
assumption, the assumption of declining marginal utility, that 
this Article now turns. 
B. DECLINING MARGINAL UTILITY 
This section discusses a number of possible definitions of 
declining marginal utility, looks at the implications of declining 
marginal utility for tax policy, and examines the evidence for 
declining marginal utility. 
1. What Is Declining Marginal Utility? 
There are many ways to describe declining marginal utili-
ty. Most intuitively, declining marginal utility of income44 
means each dollar is worth less45 than the dollar before. (“Mar-
ginal” utility of income refers, of course, to the utility of the dol-
lar “at the margin,” that is, the last dollar.) Equivalently, and 
more technically, strictly declining marginal utility of income 
means that the utility curve is strictly concave, that the slope of 
the utility curve is strictly decreasing, and that the second de-
rivative of the utility curve is negative.46 Figure 2 shows a utili-
ty function that has strictly declining marginal utility. 
 
 42. Id. at 1025. 
 43. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 14. 
 44. By “income” I mean wealth (money saved) plus consumption (money 
spent). See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 41–58 (1938) (de-
fining what has become known as the “Haig-Simons” concept of income). I do 
not mean annual income; the annual accounting system is simply an admini-
strative convenience. But see Markowitz, supra note 36, at 151 n.4 (discussing 
the Friedman-Savage curve and noting that “I wish to avoid delicate questions 
of whether the relevant utility function is the ‘utility of money’ or the ‘utility of 
income.’ I shall assume that income is discounted by some interest rate, and I 
shall speak of the ‘utility of wealth’”). 
 45. Whatever that means. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 
29–32. 
 46. A common utility function that displays strictly declining marginal 
utility of income (and is pleasantly tractable) sets the utility of income equal to 
its natural log, or  
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Less obviously, working strictly within expected utility 
theory, a person who has declining marginal utility of income is 
risk averse, and a person who is risk averse has declining mar-
ginal utility of income.47 That is, a person experiences declining 
marginal utility if and only if he will pay to avoid risk. This can 
be illustrated intuitively.48 Imagine a person who can either get 
a guaranteed $10, or can play a coin-flipping game in which he 
gets $9 if the coin comes up heads and $11 if the coin comes up 
tails. If every dollar has the same utility to him, he should be 
indifferent between the guaranteed $10, on the one hand, and 
playing the coin-flipping game, on the other hand. He is choos-
ing between a one-hundred-percent chance of $10, on the one 
hand, and a fifty-percent chance of $11 and a fifty-percent 
 
  U(income) = ln(income) 
  d/dx U(income) = d/dx ln(income) = 1/income 
  d/dx 1/income = -1/income2 
Because income2 is always positive, -1/income2 is always negative. On the ad-
vantages of a logarithmic utility function, see, for example, Griffith, supra 
note 4, at 1367–68, which states that “[t]he popularity of the logarithmic utili-
ty function surely rests, in part, on its significant computational advantages. 
It may also roughly reflect some scholars’ intuitions.” 
 47. E.g., Matthew Rabin, Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth Cannot 
Explain Risk Aversion, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 202, 202 (Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (“Within the expected-utility frame-
work, the concavity of the utility-of-wealth function is not only sufficient to 
explain risk aversion—it is also necessary: [d]iminishing marginal utility of 
wealth is the sole explanation for risk aversion.”). 
 48. For a description of the formal version of the following explanation, see 
KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 90–120 (1971).  
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chance of $9, on the other hand. The expected value (not the 
expected utility) of the latter is, of course, (50% x $11) + (50% x 
$9) = $5.50 + $4.50 = $10. 
If a person prefers the guaranteed $10 over the gamble, 
there must be some reason why the expected utility of the gam-
ble is less than the utility of its expected value, which is $10. In 
other words, there must be some reason that getting one more 
dollar is not as good as getting one fewer dollars is bad. And 
within this system, there can be only one reason: the dollar 
that brings a person from $10 to $11 is worth less, has less util-
ity, than the dollar that brings him from $9 to $10.  
Somewhat more formally: 
  50% x U($9) + 50% x U($11) < U($10) 
  50% x (U($9) + U($11)) < U($10) 
  2 x 50% x (U($9) + U($11)) < 2 x U(10)  
  U($9) + U($11) < U(10) + U(10) 
  U($11) – U($10) < U($10) – U($9) 
This last equation means, of course, that the dollar that 
takes the person from $10 to $11 has less utility than the dollar 
that takes him from $9 to $10. But this is exactly what declin-
ing marginal utility means: the next dollar is “worth less,” or 
has less utility, than the previous dollar. Thus it is equivalent 
to say that the person does not want to take the gamble be-
cause he is “risk averse,” and to say that he does not want to 
gamble because he has declining marginal utility. 
2. Implications of Declining Marginal Utility 
If all individuals have the same utility curve, declining 
marginal utility supports redistributive taxation. The reason-
ing is simple: ignoring transaction costs, the dollar will “do 
more good” in the hands of the poor person than in the hands of 
the rich person. If Rich and Penny have the same utility curve, 
and that curve has declining marginal utility, taking $100,000 
from Rich and giving it to Penny increases overall utility, be-
cause getting $100,000 increases Penny’s utility more than los-
ing $100,000 reduces Rich’s (see Figure 3). In other words, de-
clining marginal utility can, assuming that all individuals have 
the same utility function, justify redistributive taxation.49 
 
 49. At least, this is the common approach in the legal literature. See, e.g., 
Shaviro, supra note 18, at 756 (“Utilitarianism motivates redistribution from 
better-off to worse-off individuals through the assumption of diminishing mar-
ginal utility . . . . If people have identical utility functions characterized by de-
clining marginal utility, then transferring resources from better-off to worse-
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Moreover, the only reason to take a dollar from Rich (a 
person with more income) and give it to Penny (a person with 
less income) is that the dollar has more utility for Penny than 
for Rich.50 There is no other reason to try to bring the amount 
of Rich’s and Penny’s income or utility closer together; there is 
no other reason to make them more equal.51 A utilitarian cares 
 
off individuals will increase social welfare, all else equal.”); Daniel Shaviro, 
Endowment and Inequality, in TAX JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 123, 137 (“Un-
der a utilitarian calculus in which social welfare depends purely on the sum of 
people’s utilities, the motive for progressive redistribution comes mainly from 
the assumption of declining marginal utility.”); Weisbach, supra note 23, at 
S297 (“[D]eclining marginal utility of consumption . . . is an important motiva-
tion for redistribution.”). This Article situates itself within the existing ap-
proach in the legal literature. It should be noted, however, that such an ap-
proach does not take into account the use that each person will make of the 
dollar. A rich person might, for example, invest the dollar in production, which 
could in turn increase overall social welfare. See David Schmidtz, Diminishing 
Marginal Utility and Egalitarian Redistribution, 34 J. VALUE INQUIRY 263, 
266–88 (2000) (arguing that redistribution might impair overall efficiency). 
 50. Even if this calculation somehow took into account the use that each 
person would make of the money, as described in Schmidtz, supra note 49, at 
266–88, the point remains that a purely welfarist inquiry is concerned only 
about the aggregation of individual welfare, not about other values. 
 51. See, e.g., KAPLOW, supra note 5, at 378 (“It is a property of a utilitar-
ian [social welfare function] that individuals’ marginal utilities count equally, 
whereas changes in utility levels per se are irrelevant.”); Joseph Bankman, 
What Can We Say About a Wealth Tax?, 53 TAX L. REV. 477, 482–83 (2000) 
(“Most utilitarians believe that money has diminishing marginal utility and 
that interpersonal comparisons are possible. The belief in diminishing mar-
ginal utility in general pushes for equality of wealth . . . . But for the utilitar-
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only about the sum of individuals’ welfare, not about, say, so-
cial justice (unless social justice contributes to individuals’ wel-
fare). 
C. EVIDENCE OF DECLINING MARGINAL UTILITY 
Whether individual utility functions are strictly concave is 
an empirical question,52 one that, as this section explains, has 
no clear answer. This section investigates intuition, happiness 
research, and studies of risk aversion and shows that each pro-
vides some support for the proposition that individuals expe-
rience declining marginal utility of income, but none resolves 
the empirical question. 
1. Intuition 
That people experience declining marginal utility is an as-
sumption that seemingly comports with intuition and day-to-
day experience.53 But, as this subsection explains, these intui-
 
ian, at the margin, the discovery of an extra level of utility enjoyed only by the 
wealthy would lead to less redistribution, not more.”). 
 52. E.g., Bankman & Griffith, supra note 13, at 1948 (“[A]n individual 
utility function is value-free in the sense that it attempts to measure what 
does increase an individual’s utility rather than what should increase utility. 
A social welfare function, on the other hand, reflects an explicit normative 
theory of the nature of a good society.”); Kaplow, supra note 34, at 26, 37 (de-
fining an individual’s utility by U(y), a function of disposable income, and not-
ing that “[t]he degree of concavity of U(y) . . . is an empirical question because 
it is reflected, for example, in behavior under uncertainty,” and finding fault 
with such an assertion because it “mixes empirical judgments about individu-
als’ utility functions and normative judgments about the welfare function. The 
former, of course, is not a matter of the analyst’s preferences. The latter may 
be, but ultimately must be justified”). 
 53. See, e.g., Blum & Kalven, supra note 8, at 472 (stating that declining 
marginal utility seems “intuitively correct,” and suggesting that “[i]f through 
introspection we imagine ourselves in the two positions we are likely to feel 
that the loss of a dollar at the $1,000 level would be quite a different matter 
than its loss at the $100,000 level”); Friedman & Savage, supra note 22, at 282 
(discussing “a strong introspective belief in diminishing marginal utility”); 
Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the 
Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 34 (1998) (“[W]e believe that 
to neglect the concept of the diminishing marginal utility of money is to ignore 
reality. The experiential case for the proposition that money has diminishing 
marginal utility is so strong that those who argue that it does not should be 
forced to bear the burden of proof.”); Joel B. Slemrod, Progressive Taxes, LIBR. 
ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/ProgressiveTaxes.html 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2010) (referring to the idea that “paying a dollar is a less-
er sacrifice for a well-to-do person than for a poor person” as “plausible, but 
unprovable”). 
  
920 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:904 
 
tions are open to question.54 
Many commodities have declining marginal utility: the 
first chocolate chip cookie tastes wonderful, the tenth not as 
good, and the hundredth downright unpleasant.55 But not all 
commodities are like chocolate chip cookies, and depending on 
how one defines utility, some commodities might even have in-
creasing marginal utility. One’s craving for heroin, for example, 
might increase over time (even if the experience becomes less 
and less enjoyable). Moreover, the desire for chocolate chip 
cookies would change if it were possible not only to eat them, 
but also to trade them for almost anything else. 
There is, however, intuitive support for declining marginal 
utility not only of commodities (such as chocolate chip cookies), 
but also of income itself.56 It makes sense that someone first 
buys the things he values more, and buys less important things 
later, thus deriving more pleasure from, or satisfying more in-
tense preferences with, the first dollars spent.57 For example, a 
 
 54. A version of this argument is made in Sarah Lawsky, My Most Awe-
somest PrawfsBlawg Post Ever, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 3, 2009, 11:48 AM), http:// 
prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/12/my-most-awesomest-prawfsblawg 
-post-ever.html. 
 55. See also Ben Reeves, Why Some Franchises Need to Accept Death, 
GAME INFORMER, Sept. 2009, at 36 (“Why can’t we end a successful video 
game series at its peak? Here’s the problem: It’s hard to keep a property fresh 
and exciting over a long period of time. Memorable gameplay elements are joy-
ful the first time they happen, but their allure wanes each time they are im-
plemented. . . . Economists call it declining marginal utility.”). 
 56. See, e.g., McMahon & Abreu, supra note 53, at 33 (“The proposition 
that money has diminishing marginal utility follows from the empirical obser-
vation that all of the goods and services that money purchases have declining 
marginal utility.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Blum & Kalven, supra note 8, at 472 (“[Declining marginal 
utility] seems to follow from the assumption that a man tries to dispose of his 
income in a way that maximizes the satisfactions which he can get from it. 
That is, he arranges to satisfy his most important needs first, and so on down 
the line.”). This point was also raised early in the debates over the income tax.  
If it be desired to tax individual income in such manner as to press 
lighter, in proportion as that income approaches to the confines of 
bare necessity, taxation must not only be equitably apportioned, but 
must press on revenue with progressive gravity. . . . [With non-
progressive taxation a wealthy family] could not only live in abun-
dance, but could still enjoy a vast number of gratifications by no means 
essential to happiness. Whereas [a poorer family subject to the same 
tax rate] would, with our present habits of life and ways of thinking, 
be stinted in the bare necessities of subsistence. Thus a tax merely 
proportionate to individual income would be far from equitable. 
CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2514 (1864) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner) (quoting JEAN-BAPTISTE SAY, A TREATISE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY, bk. 
III, ch. VIII, at 417–18 (C.R. Prinsep trans., John Grigg ed., 3d Am. ed. 1827)). 
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person with less money might buy groceries, not theater tick-
ets, while a person with more money would buy both groceries 
and theater tickets, and this might lead us to conclude that the 
person derives more utility from groceries than from theater 
tickets.58 But while some people might have a fixed list of de-
sires and satisfy those desires in order, people might also 
change their wants and needs, and how they rank and weight 
those wants and needs, over time.59 A person’s desires might 
change because his wealth increases or decreases,60 or because 
of other life changes (for example, his family make-up changes), 
or because trends change, or simply because time passes.  
A third common defense of declining marginal utility is 
that some rich people buy very expensive, frivolous, strange 
things.61 Malcolm Forbes, for example, threw himself an ex-
travagant seventieth-birthday party in Morocco that cost about 
 
 58. Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 
767 (1995). 
 59. See generally PREFERENCE CHANGE: APPROACHES FROM PHILOSOPHY, 
ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY (Till Grüne-Yanoff & Sven Ove Hansson eds., 
2009) (discussing recent advances in modeling and theory related to under-
standing preference change).  
 60. See, e.g., Blum & Kalven, supra note 8, at 475–76 (“It is not plausible 
that the most important wants of a man with a $5000 income remain his most 
important wants when he has an income of $25,000. As his income changes his 
way of life changes. He becomes in effect a man with a different hierarchy of 
wants and values.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax Reform for Fairness 
and Simplicity: Let Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
459, 464 (1993) (“[S]imple observation tells us that . . . money clearly has di-
minishing marginal utility. Even without first hand data, one need only watch 
the television show ‘Robin Leach’s Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous’ or read 
about Malcolm Forbes’ birthday party in Morocco to realize that individuals 
with large fortunes or incomes are not as careful about how they spend their 
dollars as those of modest means—the middle class, however it may be de-
fined.”); McMahon & Abreu, supra note 53, at 35 (“[S]ignificant anecdotal evi-
dence indicates that those with very high incomes attach very little value to 
tens of thousands, or even millions, of dollars. . . . Witness the $2 million 
birthday party that Malcolm Forbes threw for himself in Morocco in 1989, or 
Bill Gates’ new $100 million mansion, or consider Ross Perot and Steve 
Forbes’s self-financed runs for the presidency.”); see also, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 
38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1876–77 (1864) (statement of Rep. Josiah Grinnell) (“It 
is time that extravagance in gewgaws, snobbishness in display, and that large 
class whose great care is to safely compound their hundreds of thousands, 
should feel that there is war and a demand which they have not yet felt on 
their purses and on their patriotism . . . . To equalize burdens and mete equal 
justice is the purpose of my amendment. Let colossal wealth . . . meet the full 
share of burdens.”). 
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$2 million.62 Forbes chartered jets to fly 800 friends to Morocco 
where he presented them with, among other attractions, a 
fireworks display, 600 belly dancers, a staged Moroccan cavalry 
charge, and Beverly Sills singing “Happy Birthday.”63 Surely a 
dollar that buys a poor person bread does more good than a dol-
lar that buys one two-millionth of Malcolm Forbes’s birthday 
party.  
But there is a gap between “doing good” and utility. An ar-
gument that gives weight to “doing good” or meeting people’s 
basic needs, rather than happiness, or desire, or preference, is a 
reasonable way to approach moral judgments, but it is a very 
particular approach, and not identical to the more common 
preference-based and subjective well-being approaches to wel-
farism.64 Most welfarists, by definition, take into account only 
factors that affect individual, self-regarding welfare functions, 
not a larger concern for societal good defined non-individual-
istically.65 
Moreover, even if comparing the tastes of a few very 
wealthy people to the needs of the very poor shows that the 
wealthy (at least, certain very wealthy people) have lower mar-
ginal utility than the poor,66 such a comparison does not pro-
vide a way to compare the marginal utility of the vast majority 
 
 62. This was $2 million in 1989, which is equivalent to about $3.5 million 
in 2010. Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., http://data.bls.gov/cgi 
-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Oct. 31, 2010) (stating that $2 million in 1989 had 
the same buying power as $3,516,274.19 in 2010). 
 63. See, e.g., Ben Macintyre, Palace Where Father Partied, TIMES (Lon-
don), Aug. 19, 1999, at 18. 
 64. Indeed, this might not be welfarism at all. See supra notes 27–34 and 
accompanying text. 
 65. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 20, at 28–29 (suggesting that tradi-
tional theories of welfare focus on what conditions cause an individual person 
to feel better off ). 
 66. E.g., Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 15, at 1421 (“Redistributing 
one dollar from the trust-fund baby to the working poor is likely to increase 
overall welfare. Paris Hilton very likely has a much lower marginal utility of 
money than someone slaving in the salt mines sixty hours a week to support 
his family. Redistribution from Paris Hilton to the worker makes sense.”); 
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Identifying Intense Preferences, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1391, 1415 (2009) (“As with comparable generalizations, one should rely 
upon this assumption [of declining marginal utility] cautiously. . . . [L]egal 
rules should aim at the relatively extreme cases: those in which the marginal 
utility to the recipients is likely to be especially large since they have no, or 
very little, of the (re)allocated good. In such cases, one may quite confidently 
assume that the marginal utility gain to the receivers is large enough to out-
weigh the possibility that the nonreceivers of the good would extract greater 
utility from it.”). 
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of income levels, which fall between the extremes of impove-
rished and blindingly wealthy. We need to know about the 
shape of the utility curve in this middle range to justify redis-
tribution from anyone other than the extremely rich to anyone 
other than the extremely poor. 
Finally, intuition can weigh against declining marginal 
utility as well as for it. As discussed above, declining marginal 
utility is, in expected utility theory, the same as risk aversion. 
If someone has declining marginal utility, he is risk averse, and 
if he is risk averse, he has declining marginal utility. But while 
it might seem obvious that a wealthy person values a dollar 
less than a poor person, it is less obvious that everyone is risk 
averse. In fact, the claim that everyone is risk averse might 
seem counterintuitive: some people love to gamble or play the 
stock market, or choose to become entrepreneurs instead of tak-
ing a job with a fixed salary. 
In short, intuitive appeals are not proof, especially intui-
tive appeals as open to question as are these. Declining mar-
ginal utility is, after all, an empirical question about the world, 
and thus the next subsections investigate empirical evidence 
for declining marginal utility. 
2. Happiness Studies 
The best evidence for declining marginal utility comes from 
so-called happiness studies. There are a number of different 
sorts of such studies. Some simply ask subjects general ques-
tions, such as, “Taking all things into account, how happy are 
you these days?”67 Others assess subjects from moment to mo-
ment, asking them throughout the day whether and how much 
they like what they are doing.68 These surveys show that re-
ported happiness increases with money, but the more money 
one has, the less additional happiness is reported from each 
additional dollar, and thus they provide evidence for declining 
marginal utility of money.69 The surveys do not, however, prove 
declining marginal utility, for at least four reasons.  
 
 67. Layard et al., supra note 30, at 1848. For a general discussion of hap-
piness surveys and other empirical measurements of welfare, see Matthew D. 
Adler, Welfare Polls: A Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1875 (2006). 
 68. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 29, at 404 (describing “ecological momen-
tary assessment”).  
 69. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 4, at 1374, 1397 (noting some problems 
with happiness surveys, but concluding that happiness surveys show that 
“[a]dditional income increases the utility of the citizens of all nations but has 
the greatest effect where those citizens are poor,” and that “[t]he classic notion 
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The first three problems with the happiness studies are 
common problems with a variety of empirical studies. First, 
happiness studies provide information only about self-reported 
happiness, which is not, of course, the same as actual happi-
ness.70 Various cognitive biases may distort people’s reports. 
More recent experiences tend to loom larger in people’s minds, 
for example, so a recent happy day may color one’s reporting of 
an entire week.71 Or testing conditions might distort one’s an-
swers—depressing testing conditions may make subjects report 
less happiness, while cheerful testing conditions may have the 
opposite effect.72 
How a researcher frames questions can also affect people’s 
answers. One study asked students to recall three positive or 
three negative recent events.73 Unsurprisingly, the students 
reported higher current life satisfaction after they recalled the 
three positive events.74 Other respondents, however, were 
asked to recall events that had happened in the more distant 
past (at least five years before).75 In contrast to the group that 
 
of declining marginal utility throughout the income distribution remains 
sound”); Layard et al., supra note 30 (reviewing “six major [happiness] sur-
veys” and concluding that marginal utility as against income falls somewhat 
faster than it would if marginal utility were inversely proportional to income); 
Andrew J. Oswald, On the Curvature of the Reporting Function from Objective 
Reality to Subjective Feelings, 100 ECON. LETTERS 369, 369 (2008) (“Large 
numbers of investigators . . . who have estimated subjective well-being regres-
sion equations on individual [happiness] data . . . have discovered that allow-
ing for a concave form . . . in income fits reported well-being data better than a 
linear income term.”). 
 70. See Griffith, supra note 4, at 1368 (“Answers to survey questions like-
ly act as imperfect measures of actual happiness.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 67, at 1915; Griffith, supra note 4, at 1369. 
The “peak-end” rule provides a similar example of the availability heuristic: in 
repeated studies, the amount of pain subjects reported in retrospect was best 
predicted not by the most painful moment experienced during the experiment, 
but by averaging the most painful moment and the last moment of the expe-
riment. Thus the peak amount of retrospectively reported pain could be re-
duced simply by tacking on thirty less painful seconds at the end of the exper-
iment. Adler, supra note 67, at 1918; Griffith, supra note 4, at 1369.  
 72. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 4, at 1370 (“Subjects interviewed on a 
sunny day are more likely to report satisfaction with their lives as a whole 
than subjects interviewed when it is raining.”). 
 73. Norbert Schwarz & Fritz Strack, Reports of Subjective Well-Being: 
Judgmental Processes and Their Methodological Implications, in WELL-BEING: 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 61, 65 (Daniel Kahneman et al. 
eds., 1999); see also Adler, supra note 67, at 1918 (citing Schwarz & Strack, 
supra, at 62–74). 
 74. Schwarz & Strack, supra note 73, at 65. 
 75. Id. 
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had recalled recent events, the students who recalled events in 
the more distant past reported higher current life satisfaction 
after recalling the negative events.76 The students seemed to 
have included the recent events in their evaluation of their cur-
rent happiness, but used the distant events as a comparison for 
their current state of mind (which benefited from the compari-
son).77 
Second, and more generally, reported happiness may de-
cline more quickly than does actual happiness.78 Imagine a per-
son who is asked to rank how he feels on a happiness scale. 
First, he figures out how happy he is; then he decides how hap-
py he should say he is. He might be unwilling ever to rank him-
self as a five on a happiness scale of one through five, with five 
as the happiest, perhaps because he does not want to suggest 
that he could never be happier.79 The curve of reported happi-
ness could thus be more concave than the curve of actual hap-
piness.80 That is, each additional dollar might increase actual 
happiness more than it increased reported happiness. It is like-
ly that the concavity of the reporting function does not fully ex-
plain the concavity of the results of the happiness studies, but 
the relationship between reported happiness and actual happi-
ness is unknown.81 
Third, a number of happiness studies examine cross-
sections of groups at a particular point in time, not groups 
across time.82 That is, such studies do not reveal what happens 
to a particular group as its income increases; rather, they com-
pare different groups with different amounts of income.83 While 
these cross-sectional studies generally show declining marginal 
utility, studies across time may, as Richard Easterlin has 
pointed out, provide a different answer.84 Indeed, when Easter-
lin analyzed data from Japan and from the United States, he 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. E.g., Oswald, supra note 69, at 369–71; Weisbach, supra note 23, 
at S308. 
 79. See Oswald, supra note 69, at 370. 
 80. Oswald, supra note 69, at 369–71; Weisbach, supra note 23, at S308. 
 81. Weisbach, supra note 23, at S308–09. 
 82. See, e.g., Richard A. Easterlin, Diminishing Marginal Utility of In-
come? Caveat Emptor, 70 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 243, 244 (2005). 
 83. Id. (“[T]he diminishing returns generalization is based on data for a 
single point of time and on a simple bivariate comparison of happiness or life 
satisfaction with income . . . .”). 
 84. Id. 
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found that even as these countries experienced economic 
growth, reported happiness did not increase significantly.85 
Easterlin did not conclude that his results would be universal, 
or that happiness was constant; he simply warned that cross-
sectional studies are “not necessarily a trustworthy guide to 
experience over time or to inferences about policy.”86 
Finally, and most crucially, not everyone believes that wel-
fare is equivalent to or well approximated by happiness.87 Stud-
ies consistently find, for example, that having children makes 
people less, not more, happy.88 One could respond to these stud-
ies with rage or doubt, but another possible response could be, 
so what? Having children could nonetheless be desirable and 
welfare increasing if welfare means more than emotional well-
being or enjoyment or moment-to-moment happiness.89 One 
might believe, for example, as many people do, that individual 
well-being consists in preference satisfaction, and thus includes 
not only happiness, but also “physical integrity, [one’s] physical 
security, [one’s] children’s well-being, whether [one] belongs to 
a group that is legally or socially subordinated, and other items 
that are not mental states.”90 Happiness studies are even more 
problematic if one takes a laundered-preference view of wel-
fare91 and believes that utility should be determined by taking 
into account only those preferences that are self-interested and 
laundered, or idealized.92 Under this account, while happiness 
and other welfare studies that examine only subjective well-
being may be consistent with declining marginal utility, they 
 
 85. Id. at 246–51. 
 86. Id. at 253. 
 87. See Diane M. Ring, Why Happiness? A Commentary on Griffith’s Pro-
gressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1413, 1414 (2004) (“Happi-
ness is a likely component of utility, but its selection requires us to consider 
what the term does and does not capture. How, and in what ways, is happi-
ness a good proxy for measuring utility? How does it compare to the concept of 
well-being. . . ?”); supra Part I.A. 
 88. See, e.g., Lorraine Ali, True or False: Having Kids Makes You Happy, 
NEWSWEEK, July 14, 2008, at 62, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/ 
143792. 
 89. See id. (“Parents still report feeling a greater sense of purpose and 
meaning in their lives than those who’ve never had kids.”). 
 90. Adler & Posner, supra note 31, at S265. 
 91. A “laundered-preference approach” is an approach that gives weight 
not to people’s actual preferences, but rather to the imagined preferences of an 
informed, rational individual who acts only out of self-interest. See supra note 
30 and accompanying text. 
 92. E.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 20, at 30–35; Adler & Posner, supra 
note 31, at S254. 
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cannot establish the shape of an individual’s overall utility 
curve, because happiness is not identical to utility. 
Thus, while happiness studies are suggestive, they do not 
establish declining marginal utility of income. 
3. Risk Aversion 
Studies of attitudes toward risk also provide evidence that 
income has declining marginal utility.93 Recall that within the 
expected utility framework, declining marginal utility is equiv-
alent to risk aversion. Thus, within expected utility, evidence of 
risk aversion is evidence of declining marginal utility. And 
there is copious evidence that people are risk averse.94 
For example, people buy insurance, which is consistent 
with risk aversion. Insurance is priced so that it has negative 
expected value. (Otherwise the insurance company would go 
out of business.) A person who has a house worth $1000 and a 
one percent chance of that house burning down has an expected 
value of $990, and some risk—he might lose no money, and he 
might lose $1000.95 Insurance that will fully compensate him 
for the loss will remove that risk, because whether or not his 
house burns down, he has his $1000 (whether in the form of his 
house or in the form of cash).96 Thus if the insurance costs $10, 
he still has an expected value of $990, but he has no risk.97 The 
insurance cannot cost $10, though, because an insurance com-
pany has to charge more than $10 for this insurance in order to 
stay in business. The purchaser in turn must have a lower ex-
pected value (not expected utility) from buying insurance than 
from not buying insurance.98 If the insurance company charges 
 
 93. See, e.g., William Vickrey, Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to 
Risk, 13 ECONOMETRICA 319, 324–33 (1945) (discussing analysis of utility in 
terms of individual choices involving risk). 
 94. See, e.g., Roger Hartley et al., Who Really Wants to Be a Millionaire? 
Estimates of Risk Aversion from Gameshow Data 3–7 (Univ. of Warwick, 
Warwick Econ. Res. Paper No. 719, 2005) (reviewing empirical research show-
ing various levels of risk aversion). 
 95. (0.99 x $1000) + (0.01 x $0) = $990. 
 96. “Worth $1000” means, in this example, the subjective value of the 
house to the house’s owner. That is, the owner in this example has insured the 
house for an amount of cash that he values as much as he values his house. 
 97. Whether the house burns down or not he has $1000, plus he has to 
pay $10 to buy the insurance.  
 98. The expected value is the number of dollars expected from the insur-
ance purchase, obtained by weighting the amount of money received from each 
possible outcome by the probability of that outcome. The expected utility is how 
much the particular individual in question enjoys or derives satisfaction from 
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$15, for example, the purchaser’s expected value if he buys in-
surance is $985,99 whereas his expected value if he does not buy 
the insurance is, as we have seen, $990.100 But many people 
buy insurance nonetheless, which means that they are willing 
to pay to get rid of risk.101 
That people are risk averse in certain situations does not 
necessarily prove that their utility curves have declining mar-
ginal utility. Matthew Rabin has shown, for example, that de-
clining marginal utility is not a plausible explanation for risk 
aversion at moderate or small stakes.102 If risk averse behavior 
can stem from something other than declining marginal utility, 
then showing that individuals are risk averse does not prove 
that individuals have declining marginal utility. In fact, a bet-
ter explanation for small-scale risk aversion is probably loss 
aversion: people care more about losing what they already have 
than about getting something they do not yet have.103 
Within expected utility theory, however, risk aversion evi-
dence generally supports declining marginal utility.104 None-
theless, as the next Part shows, some behavior cannot be ex-
plained by strictly declining marginal utility. 
 
that amount of money. See generally the discussion of utility supra text accom-
panying notes 29–36. 
 99. Whether the house burns down or not he has $1000, plus he has to 
pay $15 to buy the insurance. 
 100. See supra note 95. 
 101. Savings is sometimes cited as evidence for declining marginal utility, 
as it can be seen as a form of insurance against future lower income. See, e.g., 
Stein, supra note 10, at 382–84. The United States has an extremely low per-
sonal saving rate, however. See, e.g., Personal Saving Rate, BUREAU ECON. 
ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/briefrm/saving.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2010) 
(finding a personal savings rate of between one percent and about five percent 
of disposable personal income for 2008, 2009, and the first quarter of 2010). 
 102. Matthew Rabin, Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Cali-
bration Theorem, 68 ECONOMETRICA 1281, 1282–88 (2000) (using the example 
of someone who is risk averse in the range of approximately $100); see also 
Rabin, supra note 47, at 202–05 (same); Matthew Rabin & Richard H. Thaler, 
Anomalies: Risk Aversion, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 219, 220–24 (2001) (same).  
 103. Rabin & Thaler, supra note 102, at 226–27; see also PETER P. 
WAKKER, PROSPECT THEORY FOR RISK AND AMBIGUITY, ch. 8 (forthcoming 
2010). As Rabin and Thaler point out, myopic loss aversion explains insurance 
purchases much better than does expected utility theory. Instead of purchas-
ing insurance with high deductibles and a lot of coverage, most insurance poli-
cies have low deductibles and low levels of coverage. Rabin & Thaler, supra 
note 102, at 228. 
 104. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
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II.  AN ALTERNATIVE UTILITY CURVE   
As the last Part showed, declining marginal utility of in-
come is at least superficially consistent with intuition, and 
some evidence supports that, for some people, income has de-
clining marginal utility. However, the evidence is not conclu-
sive, and, as has long been recognized, some behavior is not 
consistent with declining marginal utility of income. For exam-
ple, declining marginal utility, or risk aversion, does not ex-
plain why people sometimes seem to prefer risk—why, for ex-
ample, many people play the lottery. And even more 
confusingly, some people seem to be both risk averse and risk 
preferring—for example, they both buy insurance and they play 
the lottery. This Part focuses on one solution to this apparent 
inconsistency: a modified utility curve, first proposed in 1948 
by Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage, and thus known as 
the Friedman-Savage utility curve.105 After describing the 
Friedman-Savage curve, this Part reviews evidence that some 
people do have utility functions that are better captured by 
Friedman-Savage curves than by curves with only declining 
marginal utility and then discusses the implications of such 
utility curves for tax policy. 
This discussion is not meant to prove that the Friedman-
Savage curve is the correct utility curve, nor that evidence is 
necessarily stronger for Friedman-Savage utility curves than 
for strictly concave utility curves. Rather, this Part problema-
tizes the assumption of declining marginal utility by presenting 
evidence for utility curves that are not strictly concave. 
A. INTRODUCING THE FRIEDMAN-SAVAGE CURVE 
As discussed above, if one accepts an expected utility 
framework, declining marginal utility is equivalent to risk 
aversion. But while many people are risk averse in some situa-
tions, some seem never to be risk averse, and others are only 
sometimes risk averse. For example, people play the lottery, 
and playing the lottery is risk-preferring behavior. A person 
with $10 has $10, with certainty. A person who begins with $10 
and pays $10 for a lottery ticket that has a one-percent chance 
of paying $1000 has moved himself into a riskier position: he 
might end up with $0, or he might end up with $1000. The ex-
pected value of a lottery ticket with a one-percent chance of 
$1000 is, of course, $10, so a person who was risk neutral would 
 
 105. Friedman & Savage, supra note 22. 
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have no preference between keeping his $10 or buying the tick-
et. But lotteries, like insurance, have negative expected value—
that is, the states running the lotteries make money.106 So a 
lottery ticket that had a one-percent chance of winning $1000 
would cost, say, $15, not $10. The expected value of that ticket 
is still $10, so a person who buys the ticket for $15 has an ex-
pected value of negative $5. A person who plays the lottery is 
thus willing to pay to assume risk.107 
That people play the lottery and engage in other risk-
preferring behavior presents a problem for expected utility 
theory if people are considered to have uniformly declining 
marginal utility. Expected utility theory imagines that a person 
chooses among alternatives by figuring out the relative utility 
(whatever that might be) of various options, weighting each op-
tion by the probability that it will occur, and then picking the 
option (or set of options) with the highest expected utility. But 
if people have declining marginal utility, expected utility theory 
cannot explain lotteries. People with declining marginal utility 
are risk averse, and thus should have to be paid to take on risk. 
They certainly should not be willing to pay for it. 
One possible explanation for why people with declining 
marginal utility play the lottery is that lottery players have bad 
information. They might be ill-informed—for example, they 
might not know the chances of winning. Or they might not un-
derstand probability, and thus cannot figure out that paying a 
dollar for a one-in-200-million108 chance of winning $20 million 
has a negative expected value, as the expected value of a lottery 
with a one-in-200-million chance of winning $20 million is, of 
course, ten cents. Thus the old saying, “The lottery is a tax on 
people who are bad at math” (or “the lottery is a tax on the stu-
pid”).109 But this is a dangerous explanation of lottery play for 
 
 106. It is more accurate to say that lotteries almost always have a negative 
expected value. If the pot gets big enough, as sometimes happens in cumula-
tive lotteries like Powerball, it is actually worthwhile to play—or would be, if 
not for taxes, which push the expected value of the lottery negative again. See, 
e.g., Jordan Ellenberg, Is Powerball a Mug’s Game?, SLATE (Aug. 31, 2001, 
8:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/114577. 
 107. See generally EDWIN J. ELTON, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND 
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS 246–48 (7th ed. 2007) (describing utility functions in 
terms of risk aversion, risk neutrality, and risk preference). 
 108. See, e.g., Powerball Payouts, COLO. LOTTERY, http://www.coloradolottery 
.com/index.cfm/ID/19/Payouts/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2010) (stating that the 
chance of winning or sharing the Powerball jackpot is one in 195,249,054). 
 109. Figuring out the expected value of Powerball is slightly more complex 
than simply dividing $20 million by 200 million. Both the odds and the 
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those who are committed to expected utility theory and welfar-
ism. If common behavior (gambling, or, more generally, taking 
on risk) can be explained only by acknowledging that people are 
irrational, expected utility theory loses much of its descriptive 
and predictive value. 
The strongest explanation for risky behavior that is consis-
tent with both expected utility theory and declining marginal 
utility is that people play the lottery (or engage in other risky 
behavior) because they enjoy the activity itself.110 Playing the 
lottery might be like any of a number of other leisure activities, 
such as going to the movies or playing basketball. The lottery 
might be enjoyable because of the thrill one gets from the mo-
ment when the balls are drawn, or, more likely, it might be en-
joyable because it allows people to dream about what life would 
be like if they had a million dollars. Ads for various state lotter-
ies play off this idea: the New York State Lottery, for example, 
ran a series of extremely successful ads, set to the song “If I 
Had a Million Dollars,” that featured ordinary people musing 
about what they would do with a million dollars.111 
While the consumption value of the lottery—the pleasure 
of playing, or of dreaming about winning—probably does ex-
plain part of why people play the lottery, it falls short of a com-
plete explanation both practically and theoretically if one is 
committed to expected utility theory. First, one can dream 
about becoming rich unexpectedly whether or not one plays the 
lottery.112 For example, someone might dream of finding a bag 
 
amount of money at stake vary depending on how many people play and how 
long it has been since someone won the jackpot. There are also different sorts 
of Powerball tickets available, and a player wins some money for matching 
fewer than six balls. See, e.g., How to Play, POWERBALL, http://www.powerball 
.com/powerball/pb_howtoplay.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2010). 
 110. See, e.g., Lloyd R. Cohen, The Lure of the Lottery, 36 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 705 passim (2001) (arguing that playing lotteries is rational because lot-
tery play is a consumption decision). 
 111. Rich Thomaselli, NY Lottery Breaks Second Ad Wave, ADVERTISING 
AGE, Feb. 25, 2002, at 6; Matt Pacenza, If I Had a Gambling Problem, CITY 
LIMITS MAG. (Mar. 2002), http://www.citylimits.org/content/articles/viewarticle 
.cfm?article_id=2713 (quoting a New York State Lottery spokesperson as say-
ing that sales of lottery tickets had increased “significantly” since the cam-
paign began). 
 112. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 4, at 92 (“[A]nyone can daydream 
about being rich.”). Indeed, while it is true that “you can’t win if you don’t 
play,” as an old Illinois Lottery slogan had it, it is not true that you can’t 
dream if you don’t play. (Given the extremely long odds against winning the 
lottery, “you can’t win even if you do play” is also not so far from the truth.) 
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of money on the ground,113 or of discovering that a great-uncle 
she never knew has left her his riches.114 But more seriously, 
taking consumption value into account proves both too much 
and too little.115 The consumption value of lotteries is, techni-
cally, integrated into the expected utility model by adding 
another function, a “dream function,” onto the usual expected 
utility calculation. Such a function might explain why lotteries 
exist, but it does not explain their structure—the probability of 
winning, the size of prizes, and so forth.116 Moreover, whatever 
one observes can be “explained” by selecting the appropriate 
dream function.117 
Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage proposed another so-
lution to the mystery of risk preferrers. They recognized that 
risk-seeking behavior was inconsistent with expected utility 
theory if all individuals experience declining marginal utility of 
income.118 But instead of questioning expected utility theory, 
either by accepting that people behave so irrationally as to 
make expected utility analysis far less useful than it might 
otherwise be, or by expanding the utility function, Friedman 
and Savage offered an alternative approach to the shape of in-
dividuals’ utility curves.119 
Risk-preferring behavior can, of course, be explained by a 
utility curve with increasing marginal utility. But such a curve 
does not resolve the problem, because many people choose to 
purchase both lottery tickets and insurance—that is, they en-
 
 113. See, e.g., MILLIONS (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2004) (presenting a story 
in which the main character becomes wealthy after a bag of money is flung at 
him from a train); SHALLOW GRAVE (Film4 Pictures 1994) (presenting a story in 
which the main character discovers a substantial amount of cash in a suitcase). 
 114. See, e.g., BEVERLY CLEARY, RAMONA FOREVER 4 (1984) (stating that 
Mr. Quimby “thought maybe [Howie Kemp’s] long-lost uncle had died and left 
him a castle full of servants, jewels, and rare old wines”); William Meredith, 
The Illiterate, in THE ART OF THE SONNET 298, 298 (Stephen Burt & David 
Mickis eds., 2010) (“I am like a man / Who turns a letter over in his hand / And 
you might think this was because the hand / was unfamiliar but, truth is, the 
man . . . / has no other means / To find out what it says than to ask someone. / 
His uncle could have left the farm to him . . . .”). 
 115. Roger Hartley & Lisa Farrell, Can Expected Utility Explain Gam-
bling?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 613, 614–15 (2002). 
 116. Id. at 615. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Friedman & Savage, supra note 22, at 280 (“Not only do risky occupa-
tions and risky investments not always yield a higher average return than 
relatively safe occupations or investments, they frequently yield a much lower 
average return.”). 
 119. Id. at 282 (introducing the “special” curve). 
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gage in both risk-averse and risk-preferring behavior. Fried-
man and Savage thus suggested that people may experience 
declining marginal utility for some lower range of income, and 
increasing marginal utility for a higher range.120 This is 
represented by a utility curve with an initial concave section, 
representing risk aversion, followed by a convex section, 
representing risk preference (Figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While a curve like that in Figure 4 explains someone who 
both buys insurance and plays the lottery, it does not quite 
solve the problem. If the utility curve remained convex, lotter-
ies would always make more money by having one big prize, ra-
ther than many little prizes.121 But lotteries typically offer sev-
eral prizes, not one huge prize. Friedman and Savage solved 
this problem by adding a third, concave section.122 This is the 
 
 120. Id. at 295. 
 121. For an intuitive sense of why this is true, imagine a lottery promoter 
who wants to make as much money as possible. Because the marginal utility 
of income increases, the utility of $100 is more than twice as much as the utili-
ty of $50. So the promoter can earn more by offering one chance at $100 than 
he can by offering two chances at $50. See also id. at 296–97 (providing a more 
detailed mathematical analysis of why lotteries have many smaller prizes). 
 122. This use of “concave” and “convex” is consistent with the current gen-
eral approach. Friedman and Savage, however, describe their curve as “two 
convex segments . . . corresponding to qualitatively different socioeconomic lev-
els, and [a] concave segment [corresponding] to the transition between the two 
levels.” Id. at 298. Friedman and Savage wrote in the 1940s, when the domi-
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Friedman-Savage curve. For the lowest range of income, mar-
ginal utility declines. For a middle range of income, marginal 
utility increases. And above some level of income, marginal 
utility declines again (Figure 5). The Friedman-Savage curve 
does not, of course, describe reality; it is a simplification of real-
ity (and does not purport to be otherwise).123 The Friedman-
Savage curve provides an explanation for insurance and risky 
behavior that is entirely internal to expected utility theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
nant approach was to imagine examining the curve from above, whereas cur-
rently the approach is to imagine examining the curve from below. That is, 
they are describing the curve as having two convex “from above” segments (be-
cause upon observation from above, the two sections appear to curve away 
from the viewer), whereas I describe the curve as having two concave “from 
below” segments (because on observation from below, the two segments seem 
to curve toward the viewer). See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 646 (2d 
ed. 1989) (defining concave as “having a curvature that presents a hollow to 
the point of observation,” and convex as “having a curvature that bulges to-
ward the point of observation” (emphasis added)); Friedman & Savage, supra 
note 22, at 294 (using the terminology “convex from above” and “concave from 
above”); Adolf Kozlik, Note on the Terminology Convex and Concave, 31 AMER. 
ECON. REV. 103, 104 n.5 (1941) (“[T]he expression ‘convex or concave from 
above’ is more commonly used than ‘concave or convex from below’ and there-
fore should be adopted.”). 
 123. Harry Markowitz, for example, improved upon the Friedman-Savage 
curve, positing that the origin of a Friedman-Savage curve should be consid-
ered current wealth, and that another convex segment should be added to the 
left of the origin. Markowitz, supra note 36, at 151–54. There is also empirical 
evidence supporting Markowitz’s version of the curve. See, e.g., Emily Haisley 
et al., Myopic Risk-Seeking: The Impact of Narrow Decision Bracketing on Lot-
tery Play, 37 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 57, 59–60 (2008) (describing evidence for 
Markowitz’s utility function, in particular the underweighting of small gains 
and small losses, or the “peanut effect”). Charles Karelis proposes a different 
utility curve in which the marginal utility of income increases not at a mid-
range of income, but rather at very low levels of income, and decreases once 
certain basic needs are met. CHARLES KARELIS, THE PERSISTENCE OF 
POVERTY: WHY THE ECONOMICS OF THE WELL-OFF CAN’T HELP THE POOR 67–
85 (2007). Karelis shows that his utility curve comports perhaps even more 
strongly with intuition than does a utility curve with strictly declining mar-
ginal utility. Id. Karelis’s proposed utility curve problematizes the usual ar-
gument for progressive taxation, id. at 153–63, though in different ways than 
does the Friedman-Savage curve. 
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B. EVIDENCE OF FRIEDMAN-SAVAGE CURVES 
This Part describes intuitive and empirical support for the 
Friedman-Savage curve. 
1. Intuition 
Although no story need be attached to utility curves,124 one 
might reasonably ask for a story to explain the Friedman-
Savage curve. Why would utility decrease, increase, and then 
decrease again? Does this curve represent mere ad hoc-ery, a 
technical solution that fails to speak in any way to common 
sense or shared experience? As it happens, the Friedman-
Savage curve can be connected with a plausible story: as 
Friedman and Savage suggested, the two segments with declin-
ing marginal utility can be taken to represent distinct classes, 
or “socioeconomic levels.”125 An increase in income that does not 
 
 124. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 102, at 1282 n.3 (“My wording . . . gives a 
psychological interpretation to the concavity of the utility function. Yet a refer-
ee has reminded me that a common perspective among economists studying 
choice under uncertainty has been that the concavity of the utility function 
need be given no psychological interpretation.”). 
 125. Friedman & Savage, supra note 22, at 298. Friedman and Savage ac-
knowledge that there may be more than two “qualitatively distinguishable so-
cial classes,” each of which should be represented by a new bend in the curve. 
Id. at 299. They also, however, state that “[a]t the moment, there seems to be 
no observed behavior that requires the introduction of additional . . . seg-
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shift someone out of his class has diminishing marginal utili-
ty.126 The middle section, with increasing marginal utility, 
represents the transition between the two classes.127 Such a 
utility curve would particularly make sense if income confers 
benefits beyond what one can buy directly—that is, if wealth is 
not simply delayed consumption. (This portion might be ex-
tremely steep, if the two classes are almost completely discrete, 
or it might be more moderate, if the additional benefits of great 
wealth accrue incrementally.) 
Thus, while an extra dollar to a middle-class person might 
mean no more than additional purchasing power, as a some-
what well-off person accumulates more money, he may enter a 
different sort of world altogether. A moderately wealthy person 
might be able to contribute $1000 to a political campaign; an 
extremely wealthy person (wherever the cut off is for “extreme-
ly wealthy”) might be able to wield political power by hiring a 
lobbyist, by promising politicians access to other very wealthy 
people, or even by contributing enough money to a PAC or po-
litical party to change the outcome of an election. A moderately 
wealthy person might be able to get a fancy new television; an 
extremely wealthy person might be able to gain admission to 
various exclusive social clubs, giving him not only the pleasure 
of admission, but also even more access to people in power. In-
come, of course, brings value in the form of consumption, but 
some people have more money than they could spend in a life-
time, and still continue to accumulate more. This additional in-
come does have value, not because these extremely wealthy 
people can buy yet another new house or new car, but because 
these additional resources give them access to other kinds of 
power.128 
 
ments, so it seems undesirable and unnecessary to complicate the hypothesis 
further.” Id. 
 126. Id. at 304. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Compare, e.g., HENRY CALVERT SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 
97 (1938) (“In a world where capital accumulation proceeds as it does now, 
there is something sadly inadequate about the idea of saving as postponed 
consumption.”), Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and 
Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX L. REV. 
363, 371 (1996) (“[P]rivate wealth remains a source of current social, economic 
and political power that goes beyond the potential use of wealth for consump-
tion. In addition to the social and political influence that wealth creates, the 
possession of wealth confers significant economic security; one need not con-
sume wealth to bask in its benefits.”), and Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1406–
07 (“Wealth confers power beyond its consumption value. This power is eco-
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2. Empirics 
The shape of individuals’ utility curves is a factual ques-
tion, though, not a theoretical one. And studies suggest that 
some individuals’ utility curves are indeed better modeled by a 
Friedman-Savage utility curve than by a strictly concave utility 
curve.  
There is some support for the Friedman-Savage curve at a 
societal level. As discussed above, the story behind the Fried-
man-Savage curve is that some amount of additional income al-
lows an individual to climb into a new, qualitatively better so-
cial or economic class. If gambling is one of the few ways to get 
enough money to make this leap, societies with higher inequali-
ty should show higher levels of gambling.129 And this is precise-
ly what one study of sixty societies showed. The study ex-
amined the presence of games of chance in various non-
European-based societies in the late 1800s (that is, before much 
contact with European-based societies) and found that, consis-
tent with Friedman-Savage curves, social inequality was a sta-
tistically significant contributor to a society’s level of gam-
bling.130 
As one might expect, studies of individual risk takers also 
reveal attitudes consistent with Friedman-Savage curves. For 
example, bettors’ attitudes towards risk have been shown to be 
consistent with a Friedman-Savage utility curve. One model, 
 
nomic, social, and political.”), with, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 15, 
at 1448–51 (arguing that wealth offers benefits only because it can be used to 
buy things, and that power and prestige “likely come more from labor than 
from savings”). See also WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corpora-
tion 1987) (“Wake up pal, if you’re not inside you’re outside. And I’m not talk-
ing a $200,000 a year working Wall Street stiff flying first class and being 
‘comfortable.’ I’m talking rich, pal, rich enough to fly in your own jet, rich 
enough not to waste time, 50, 100 million, a player, Bud—or nothing.”). See gen-
erally Louis Kaplow, Utility from Accumulation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 15595, 2009) (providing a formal model of the ef-
fect of individuals’ “deriv[ing] utility from accumulation, that is, from the 
possession (in contrast with the expenditure) of wealth,” and providing cita-
tions to various literature that investigates the extent to which individuals 
derive utility from wealth, as opposed to consumption). 
 129. Frederic L. Pryor, The Friedman-Savage Utility Function in Cross-
Cultural Perspective, 84 J. POL. ECON. 821, 823 (1976) (“[T]here should be a 
positive correlation between socioeconomic inequality and the presence of 
gambling.”). 
 130. The study controlled for a number of factors, including whether the 
society had experienced contact with “the West,” whether the culture was risk 
loving, and the degree to which the society was individual, as opposed to 
group, oriented. Id. 
  
938 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:904 
 
based on data including nearly 35,000 horse races, with a total 
of over 350,000 horses, found that racetrack bettors’ estimated 
utility function had a shape similar to the Friedman-Savage 
utility function.131 
Another study supporting the Friedman-Savage hypothesis 
analyzed data from a 900-person survey about gambling and 
found that among people who participated in lotteries, the less 
satisfied the person was with his current income, the more he 
tended to spend on the lottery.132 The lottery, unlike other 
forms of gambling such as poker or bingo, which produce small-
er payouts, provided the person with the chance to increase his 
income dramatically and thus take the leap into or over the 
area of the utility curve with increasing marginal utility.133 
Studies that did not focus on gamblers also reached results 
consistent with the Friedman-Savage curve. One study asked 
over 2500 Dutch households to choose between a fixed amount 
of money and a gamble.134 For example, the participants might 
be asked to imagine that they had a choice between a sure $1 or 
a chance to win $100. They would then be asked to pick the 
odds that would make them choose the chance for $100 over the 
sure $1. The odds selected would give information about the 
participant’s attitude toward risk. A risk-neutral person, for 
example, would select the chance at $100 if the chance of win-
ning was greater than one percent, because $1 is one percent of 
$100. 
The study varied the risk-free amount offered (in the ex-
ample above, $1) from about $50 to about $5000, and kept the 
risky prize fixed at about $20,000.135 Most of the respondents 
 
 131. Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié, Estimating Preferences Under Risk: 
The Case of Racetrack Bettors, 108 J. POL. ECON. 503, 525 (2000). The data in-
cluded 34,443 races and 367,408 horses. Id. at 506. Of course, as with any 
model, this model depends on certain simplifications, and thus, as the authors 
note, “this particular exercise cannot pretend to realism.” Id. at 525. Nonethe-
less, the results are suggestive, because their results are particularly strong 
when the amount at risk is large, and the amounts at risk would generally 
tend to be larger than the amount bet on a horse race. Id. 
 132. Gregory G. Brunk, A Test of the Friedman-Savage Gambling Model, 
96 Q.J. ECON. 341, 345 & 346 tbl.2 (1981). 
 133. See id. at 344–45 (noting that among lotteries, football pools, bingo, 
raffles, and poker, “only the purchase of lottery tickets could result in a large 
increase in wealth that the Friedman-Savage model suggests is a motivation 
for gambling”). 
 134. Joseph G. Eisenhauer, How Prevalent Are Friedman-Savage Utility 
Functions?, BRIEFING NOTES ECON., Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 1, 3. 
 135. The initial amounts ranged from ƒ100 to ƒ10,000. The sign “ƒ” 
represents the Dutch guilder; this version of the question was asked in 1993, 
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were risk averse, regardless of the risk-free amount offered. 
None of the respondents were risk loving for all amounts of-
fered, and only one percent of the respondents were risk neu-
tral. But about twenty percent of the respondents showed dif-
ferent risk attitudes depending on the initial amount offered: 
some were risk averse at lower amounts but were either risk 
neutral or risk loving at higher amounts, and others were risk 
neutral at lower amounts and risk loving at higher amounts. In 
other words, about twenty percent of the respondents showed 
some inflection point in their utility curves. Indeed, this must 
be considered a lower bound, because some of the respondents 
who were consistently risk averse might have some threshold of 
income greater than those proposed in the study past which 
they would be either risk neutral or risk loving.136 That is, had 
the risk-free amount been increased even more, these respond-
ents might have revealed themselves to be risk neutral or risk 
loving given that higher risk free amount, which was, in this 
experiment, the stand in for income. 
In short, it is plausible that at least some people have a 
utility curve that does not display declining marginal utility, 
but rather has locally increasing marginal utility. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASING MARGINAL UTILITY   
As the last Part showed, declining marginal utility may not 
be universal: evidence suggests that at least some people, over 
some range of income, have increasing marginal utility. This 
Part shows the tax policy implications of this counterintuitive 
finding and suggests how legal scholarship might change if 
some people do not have declining marginal utility. Because, as 
described above,137 there is some empirical evidence for Fried-
man-Savage utility curves, both sections use Friedman-Savage 
curves as the example of how marginal utility might increase. 
 
before the Netherlands adopted the Euro as its currency. In January 1993, the 
guilders-to-dollars exchange rate was approximately 0.55 dollars to one guild-
er. Historical Exchange Rates, OANDA, http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2010). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See supra Part II.B. 
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A. TAX POLICY MEETS FRIEDMAN-SAVAGE 
This section examines the tax policy implications of accept-
ing that at least some people have increasing marginal utility, 
as captured by Friedman-Savage utility curves.138 
A welfarist who does not explicitly incorporate equality in-
to his analysis (that is, a nonegalitarian welfarist) and assumes 
that all individuals have Friedman-Savage utility curves (that 
is, all utility curves are convex for some range of income) will 
recommend a tax system that is quite different than the cur-
rent progressive, redistributive system. A welfarist who does 
not explicitly incorporate equality into his analysis maximizes 
utility by summing individuals’ utility, giving equal weight to 
each individual.139 Thus, he always wants to take a dollar from 
someone with lower marginal utility and give that dollar to 
someone with higher marginal utility.  
Return to the world with only two people: Rich and Penny. 
If there is only one dollar to distribute, and the goal is to in-
crease overall utility, then Rich and Penny’s total utility is ir-
relevant. All that matters is how much utility each would de-
rive from receiving this next dollar. If Penny would derive more 
utility than would Rich, then, regardless of how much utility 
each has right now, a nonegalitarian welfarist would give the 
dollar to Penny. Moreover, if taking a dollar from Rich reduces 
Rich’s utility less than giving a dollar to Penny increases her 
utility, a nonegalitarian welfarist would transfer a dollar from 
Rich to Penny regardless of how much utility each has. In fact, 
such a welfarist would transfer dollars from Rich to Penny as 
long as Rich’s marginal utility remains less than Penny’s. The 
transferring should stop only when the two have equal margin-
al utility, because only then will the next transfer make no dif-
ference—only then will the next transfer fail to increase overall 
utility. And indeed, the goal of a nonegalitarian welfarist is to 
reach a point where everyone has equal marginal utility. 
 
 138. I do not analyze here the efficiency or distortive effects of redistribu-
tion in a world with Friedman-Savage curves; rather, I discuss only distribu-
tional concerns. Thus, I do not present a full optimal tax analysis of a world 
where individuals have Friedman-Savage curves. Cf., e.g., KAPLOW, supra 
note 5, at 29–30 (noting that there are two dimensions to any welfarist analy-
sis of a tax policy, and describing a two-step analysis that involves, first, a 
“distribution-neutral income tax adjustment” and, second, a “purely redistri-
butive income tax adjustment”). 
 139. Another approach would be to maximize average utility (that is, sum 
individuals’ utility and then divide by the number of individuals). Whichever 
approach one chooses, the analysis in this section remains the same. 
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A shared utility curve with a convex portion mandates re-
distribution, as in the current system, but unlike the current 
system, a Friedman-Savage curve mandates some redistribu-
tion from those with less money to those with more. If Penny is 
not actually poor, but rather has enough income to meet all her 
basic needs and somewhat more, she may be on a relatively flat 
portion of the utility curve, and her next dollar thus has rela-
tively little utility. Rich, on the other hand, is rich but not ex-
tremely rich, and thus he is on a steep part of the curve, so that 
his next dollar has a relatively high utility for him. A nonegali-
tarian welfarist takes money from Penny and gives it to Rich 
until both have the same marginal utility, even though Penny 
has less money than Rich to begin with.  
A simple example shows why. Imagine, as in Figure 6, that 
Penny and Rich both have the same utility curve, a Friedman-
Savage curve. Before any redistribution, Penny has $200,000 
(adding three zeroes to the numbers in Figure 6, to keep things 
interesting) and Rich has $400,000. Penny is still on the declin-
ing marginal utility portion of the curve, but Rich has enough 
income that he actually has increasing marginal utility. As 
Figure 6 suggests, total utility is about 100 utils. After money 
is transferred from Penny to Rich until they have equal mar-
ginal utility, Rich has $500,000 and Penny has $100,000, and 
total utility has increased to about 110 utils. It makes perfect 
sense that total utility has increased, because we know that 
while each of Penny’s last $100,000 had less and less value to 
her, each of Rich’s new $100,000 has more and more value to 
him.  
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While equal marginal utility is necessary to optimal distri-
bution for a nonegalitarian welfarist, it is not sufficient if utili-
ty curves are not strictly concave. On a Friedman-Savage 
curve, marginal utility would also be equalized by transferring 
money from Rich to Penny until both had the same amount of 
money. But this would not maximize utility. To maximize utili-
ty, transfers take place only when the marginal utility of the 
transferor’s previous dollar is less than the marginal utility of 
the recipient’s next dollar. Because Rich’s portion of the utility 
curve is steep, the marginal utility of his previous dollar is 
greater than the marginal utility of Penny’s next dollar.  
For example, if Rich transfers money to Penny until both 
have $300,000, they will obviously have the same marginal 
utility, because they will both be at the same place on the utili-
ty curve. But their total utility will be only about ninety-five, 
because Rich gave dollars to Penny that had less utility to her 
than to him, and thus the transfer reduced the amount of total 
utility. (If the curve is strictly concave, the marginal utility of 
the wealthier person’s previous dollar will always exceed or 
equal the marginal utility of the less wealthy person’s next dol-
lar, simply because we have defined our curve so that an in-
crease in money means a decrease in marginal utility, and 
equalizing marginal utility is thus both necessary and suffi-
cient to maximize utility.)140 
The tax policy recommendations are similar but perhaps 
even more drastic under the assumption that not everyone has 
a Friedman-Savage curve, but rather that most people have 
strictly concave utility curves and only some people have 
Friedman-Savage curves.141 In Figure 7, Penny’s and Rich’s 
utility curves are identical up to a point, after which Penny’s 
marginal utility continues to decrease, while Rich experiences 
increasing marginal utility. After this portion, if the two have 
the same income, Rich has higher utility than Penny, but the 
two have identical marginal utility.  
 
 
 140. Additionally, if everyone has the same utility curve and that curve is 
concave, a nonegalitarian (or utilitarian) welfare function recommends that 
everyone have the same amount of wealth. KAPLOW, supra note 5, at 47. 
 141. Friedman and Savage themselves argued that their curve would be 
relevant even if not shared by everyone. Friedman & Savage, supra note 22, at 
299 (“[I]t is not necessary that every consumer unit have a utility curve [like 
the Friedman-Savage curve]. Some may be inveterate gamblers; others, invet-
erately cautious. It is enough that many consumer units have such a utility 
curve.”). 
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In this scenario, as in the last scenario, Penny will some-
times be called upon to transfer to Rich when she has less in-
come than he does. But Rich will be asked to transfer to Penny 
only when he has more income than she does. Rich, that is, will 
sometimes be the beneficiary of redistribution from those who 
are less wealthy, but Penny never will be. (She might, however, 
be the beneficiary of redistribution from those who are more 
wealthy and have lower marginal utility than she does.) 
Assuming that at least some people have Friedman-Savage 
curves does not necessarily mean that the tax system should 
redistribute from the truly poor to the wealthy. A very poor 
person might well always be on a steeper portion of the utility 
curve than anyone else.142 To put this in terms of the story 
about Friedman-Savage curves, it might be that everyone de-
rives more utility from income that permits him to buy bread to 
prevent himself from starving than from income that pushes 
him into an elite class with access to political power and exclu-
sive clubs. More concretely, a Friedman-Savage utility curve 
could be consistent with the government’s current level of re-
distribution to the very poor.143 While very poor people pay 
 
 142. Of course, it is not actually possible to measure an individual’s utility 
with such accuracy, but this Article generally works within the assumptions 
made by various welfarist scholars. See discussion supra text accompanying 
notes 28–33. 
 143. See generally KAPLOW, supra note 5, at 151–78 (discussing transfer 
payments and noting that taxes and transfer programs should be considered 
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some tax,144 this payment may be more than offset by various 
sorts of transfers from the government, both cash (whether 
from welfare145 or the earned income tax credit146) and in-kind 
(such as Medicaid,147 food stamps,148 and housing vouchers149). 
Net transfers to the poor are defensible under a nonegalitarian 
welfarist analysis and a Friedman-Savage utility curve if the 
initial section of the utility curve is steeper than any other sec-
tion. 
But if marginal utility increases for some range of money, 
some wealthier people will always have greater marginal utili-
ty than some less-wealthy people. Thus, there should, in prin-
ciple, be some upward redistribution from the middle class 
(say) to the more wealthy. For example, in 2008 and 2009, the 
government transferred billions of dollars to private companies 
in an attempt to stem economic collapse.150 One of those com-
panies, American International Group, or AIG, received about 
$170 billion from the government and then paid $165 million in 
bonuses to its executives.151 Over seventy people received bo-
nuses of more than $1 million each, including six people who 
received more than $4 million each and one person who re-
 
as a whole, since “[i]t simply does not matter if the income tax makes poor in-
dividuals pay some tax as long as the generosity of transfer payments makes 
up the difference”). 
 144. There is a small zero bracket for income tax, but social insurance tax-
es (also known as “payroll taxes”) are imposed from the first dollar of earnings. 
Social security tax is 6.2 percent of wages, I.R.C. § 3101 (2006), and Medicare 
tax is 1.45 percent of wages, id. Compare id. § 1 (imposing tax on taxable in-
come), and id. § 63 (reducing taxable income by either a fixed-amount deduc-
tion or, if greater, itemized deductions), and id. § 151 (reducing taxable income 
by the amount of a personal exemption), with id. § 3101 (imposing social in-
surance tax on employees’ wages), and id. § 3121 (defining “wages” for social 
insurance tax purposes as including all remuneration, with some exceptions). 
 145. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–619 (2006) (providing block grants to states for tem-
porary assistance to needy families). 
 146. I.R.C. § 32 (providing a refundable credit, known as the “earned in-
come tax credit”). 
 147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396v (authorizing health care payments for low-
income individuals). 
 148. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036 (2006) (authorizing the Supplemental Nutri-
tion Assistance Program). 
 149. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (authorizing the Housing Choice Voucher Program). 
 150. This included transfers under the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765, as well as loans from the 
Federal Reserve. 
 151. Louise Story, Cuomo Details Million-Dollar Bonuses at A.I.G., N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/business/18cuomo 
.html. 
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ceived $6.4 million.152 These bonuses were met by outrage. 
Some of this outrage was due, surely, to the feeling that AIG 
had done something morally wrong.153 But some of the outrage 
seemed due more to the idea that the government would trans-
fer taxpayer dollars to the already wealthy.154 A Friedman-
Savage utility curve does, however, sometimes support trans-
fers from the less wealthy to the more wealthy. In contrast, the 
government did not bail out Lehman Brothers, and as a result 
many wealthy people lost their job, savings, and social stat-
us.155 A Friedman-Savage curve and a nonegalitarian welfare 
function might well have supported payments to the Lehman 
Brothers employees, like the payments to AIG, where the gov-
ernment used tax dollars to pay relatively wealthy individuals 
who might be on a steeper portion of the utility curve. This is 
not to endorse such a policy, but rather to suggest that it might 
be an implication of nonegalitarian welfarism plus a Friedman-
Savage curve. Similarly, tax shelters might be, overall, a good 
thing. Tax shelters are risky, and those who engage in tax shel-
ters tend to be wealthy. Thus, tax shelters might effectively re-
duce the tax paid by wealthy, risk-preferring individuals, exact-
ly those who could be on the steeper part of the Friedman-
Savage curve.156 
Assuming that at least some individual utility functions 
are better represented by a Friedman-Savage curve than a 
strictly concave curve—that is, assuming that marginal utility 
is not strictly declining—pushes toward unfamiliar tax policy 
recommendations. Combined with a nonegalitarian social wel-
fare function, Friedman-Savage utility curves, like strictly con-
cave utility curves, mandate redistribution. But unlike strictly 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. For example, in a U.S. House committee meeting, Representative Paul 
Hodes said that AIG stood for “arrogance, incompetence and greed,” and 
House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer said that people felt “anger and disgust” 
about the bonuses. Randall Smith & Liam Pleven, Some Will Pay Back AIG 
Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at A1. The outrage was a bit odd given 
that $165 million is less than one-tenth of one percent of $170 billion. 
 154. See, e.g., Editorial, Grabby at AIG, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 17, 2009, 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2009/03/
17/grabby_at_aig. 
 155. See, e.g., Louise Story & Landon Thomas Jr., Tales from Lehman’s 
Crypt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at BU1, available at 2009 WLNR 17964914 
(describing the effects of the Lehman bankruptcy on some of the members of the 
financial industry who worked there). 
 156. I thank Ethan Yale, Hunton & Williams Professor of Law at the Uni-
versity of Virginia School of Law, for this point. 
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concave utility curves, Friedman-Savage curves mandate at 
least some redistribution from those with less money to those 
with more money.  
B. WHAT’S A WELFARIST TO DO? 
We can group the responses a welfarist might have to this 
discussion into two categories, which we might call “refusal” 
and “accommodation.” 
1. Refusal 
First, a welfarist might find this discussion completely un-
convincing, and might insist that everyone does have declining 
marginal utility. It is difficult to know what to say to this, other 
than to investigate the source of the conviction, given the lack 
of proof of declining marginal utility. Someone might think that 
wealthier people should care less about the next dollar than do 
less-wealthy people, but the shape of an individual’s utility 
function is a fact, not a moral judgment.157 Or someone might 
have a commitment to both nonegalitarian welfarism and redis-
tribution (moral judgments), and thus conclude that marginal 
utility declines (a fact about the world). A deep conviction that 
declining marginal utility is true might be an example of the 
moralistic fallacy,158 or what one might call the “ought-is” prob-
lem,159 whereby one derives the descriptive from the normative. 
Relatedly, this could be an example of what is known in psy-
chology as motivated cognition. People may feel a moral com-
mitment to redistribution, and this moral commitment might in 
turn shape how they perceive facts about the world, facts which 
are ostensibly not moral judgments.160 
 
 157. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; cf. Thomas Nagel, Personal 
Rights and Public Space, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 92 (1995) (“This is a curious 
type of argument, for it has the form that P is true because it would be better 
if it were true. That is not in general a cogent form of argument: One cannot 
use it to prove that there is an afterlife, for example. However, it may have a 
place in ethical theory, where its conclusion is not factual but moral.”). 
 158. Bernard B. Davis, The Moralistic Fallacy, 272 NATURE 390, 390 (1978) 
(coining the term “moralistic fallacy” and defining it as “an illogical effort to 
derive an ‘is’ from an ‘ought’”). 
 159. Cf. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469 (L.A. Selby-
Bigge et al. eds., 2d ed. 1978) (identifying the “is-ought” problem, whereby the 
normative is derived from the descriptive); Hume’s Moral Philosophy, 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume 
-moral (last updated Aug. 27, 2010) (explaining the is-ought problem). 
 160. E.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going To Believe? Scott 
v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 842–
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Second, a welfarist might accept that some people do not 
have declining marginal utility, and might even have Fried-
man-Savage curves, but might believe that there are not 
enough people with Friedman-Savage curves to make it worth-
while to think about them. The current dominant model, in 
other words, is right enough.161 It is not clear what standard is 
being applied here. Perhaps the claim is that there are, numer-
ically, too few people who are locally risk preferring to count. 
This would have to be based on empirical work, though, not in-
tuition, and there is no empirical work that shows that only a 
tiny minority of people are locally risk preferring. To the con-
trary, as discussed above, one study found that twenty percent 
of people showed local risk preference, and this number was a 
lower bound.162 
Third, a welfarist might accept that some people do not 
have declining marginal utility, but might argue that the gov-
ernment cannot distinguish among those who have entirely de-
clining marginal utility and those who do not. Therefore, the 
argument would go, because it seems that a majority of people 
have declining marginal utility, policy should be constructed as 
though everyone has declining marginal utility. This is an in-
teresting problem. There are, of course, typical behaviors that 
could mark people as having locally increasing marginal utility. 
These people would take more risks—they might choose to 
work in the financial services industry, for example, or gamble, 
or engage in tax shelters. And people’s willingness to take bets 
with an apparently negative expected value might even indi-
cate where they fall on a utility curve. But what makes this 
problem interesting is that if the government redistributes to 
people who have locally increasing marginal utility, everyone 
has an incentive to act as if he has locally increasing marginal 
 
43 (2009) (“Social psychology teaches us that our perceptions of fact are perva-
sively shaped by our commitments to shared but contested views of individual 
virtue and social justice. It also tells us that although our ability to perceive 
this type of value-motivated cognition in others is quite acute, our power to 
perceive it in ourselves tends to be quite poor.”). An emotional commitment to 
redistribution or to declining marginal utility might also explain the vigorous 
response some people have to the suggestion that marginal utility does not 
strictly decline. One legal academic, for example, has referred without elabor-
ation to the Friedman-Savage curve as “the most implausible investment ra-
tionale for the lottery.” Cohen, supra note 110, at 715 n.16. 
 161. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 162. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text. 
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utility.163 And redistributing by lowering tax on activities that 
might be associated with having a Friedman-Savage curve, 
rather than on individuals, will distort the incentives to engage 
in those activities. On the margin, that is, a person might 
choose to engage in a risky activity not because he has a 
Friedman-Savage curve, but just to take advantage of the lower 
tax rate.  
This is a version of the basic information problem underly-
ing optimal taxation: a tax system must somehow take into ac-
count that high earners try to disguise themselves as low earn-
ers to reduce their tax, by, for example, lying about their 
income. Although it can be difficult to distinguish among people 
with differing preferences, it is not impossible,164 and further 
study and modeling could point toward the amount that should 
be expended in making this distinction. A normative commit-
ment to declining marginal utility or to redistribution would be 
the only a priori reason to conclude that the correct expendi-
ture is zero. 
The third refusal relates to the last: a welfarist might ac-
cept that a fair number of people have Friedman-Savage curves 
or some other utility curve that is not strictly concave, but 
might still not want to consider these alternative curves, be-
cause they make modeling too difficult. Optimal tax modeling 
usually assumes that everyone has the same preferences, and 
imagining that individuals have different preferences does 
complicate things. This is not an intractable problem: some, 
most notably Louis Kaplow, have begun modeling heterogene-
ous preferences.165 But heterogeneous preferences do make 
modeling significantly more difficult. 
 
 163. See, e.g., KAPLOW, supra note 5, at 47 (citing ABBA P. LERNER, THE 
ECONOMICS OF CONTROL 29 (Macmillan 1960), for the proposition that equal 
distribution should be extended “to the case in which individuals’ utility func-
tions may differ and the government cannot observe utility functions”); 
LERNER, supra (noting that “[e]very individual could declare that he has ex-
ceptionally high capacities for satisfaction and so should be given more income 
than anybody else if total satisfaction is to be maximized; and there is no way 
of testing the validity of such a claim,” and showing that “[i]f it is impossible, 
on any division of income, to discover which of any two individuals has a high-
er marginal utility of income, the probable value of total satisfactions is max-
imized by dividing income evenly”).  
 164. See, e.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 66 (proposing multiple ways to 
accurately identify various heterogeneous preferences). 
 165. E.g., Louis Kaplow, Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences, 8 
BERKELEY ELECTRONIC J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 2 (2008). 
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Given the added complexity of modeling heterogeneous 
preferences, the “too difficult” response might be fair for an 
economist who uses models to gain knowledge incrementally, 
testing what happens with a different assumption or a different 
set of data. But it is less acceptable for a law professor who is 
arguing for a practical result, or a concrete tax policy. Another 
version of this response calls on Ockham’s Razor, or the idea 
that the best theories are the simplest ones.166 But Ockham’s 
Razor is a heuristic, not a proven theory or a scientific prin-
ciple. Those who claim to think about the real world and who 
propose concrete changes in the world cannot refuse to ac-
knowledge concrete evidence simply because that evidence 
points towards complexity.  
Additionally, a curve with declining marginal utility is not 
the simplest utility curve. Ockham’s Razor would seem to push 
us not toward declining marginal utility, but constant marginal 
utility (as in Figure 1). Many economic models assume utility 
that is linear in income, that is, utility that has a constant 
marginal utility. Constant marginal utility can also serve as 
the basis for concrete proposals: a Canadian tax policy commis-
sion, for example, assumed constant marginal utility when it 
made its policy recommendations.167 But the U.S. legal acade-
my does not take this simple approach, preferring to assume 
declining marginal utility, with its more complicated concave 
utility curve. Again, there could be a normative justification for 
preferring a strictly concave utility curve, but simplicity cannot 
be the only reason, because other curves are just as simple (or 
simpler). 
2. Accommodation 
A welfarist who accepts that some people do not have de-
clining marginal utility can accommodate that fact in at least 
one of three ways: she can accept redistribution that increases 
inequality; she can explicitly incorporate equality into her 
 
 166. E.g., David A. Weisbach, What Does Happiness Research Tell Us 
About Taxation?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S293, S295 (2008) (“A standard response 
is to use Occam’s razor to argue for a higher standard of proof on models that 
add complexity to the utility function . . . .”). 
 167. Theodore P. Seto & Sande L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay 
and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053, 1101–02 (2006). As 
described in Seto & Buhai, supra, the Canadian commission nonetheless rec-
ommended effectively progressive taxation, because it took as the tax base “in-
come available for discretionary use.” Id. 
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analysis; or she can continue to act as if marginal utility de-
clines, while acknowledging that it does not.  
First, a welfarist might accept the perhaps odd policy rec-
ommendations that arise from taking a nonegalitarian ap-
proach and accepting that some people do not have strictly de-
clining marginal utility. Nonegalitarian welfarism might be 
more important to her than is equality. Accordingly, she might 
encourage redistribution from the less wealthy to wealthier 
people with local risk preference. She will be concerned about 
increased inequality only if she believes that equality should be 
incorporated into individuals’ utility functions and that ine-
quality reduces utility. And if she does not want to expand the 
utility function to include equality as a source of welfare, she 
will simply give no weight to equality. This seems to me to be a 
perfectly acceptable approach. The argument against it would 
either be an argument about social welfare functions, or an ar-
gument whether welfarism is an acceptable approach to distri-
bution, and these are important arguments. 
Second, a welfarist might decide that equality is actually 
important to her, regardless of whether it increases individuals’ 
utility. She could incorporate equality into her analysis in any 
number of ways. She could remain a pure welfarist and select a 
social welfare function that weights the well-being of the less 
well-off more than the well-being of the more well-off. She could 
also, however, decide that aggregating individuals’ utility is not 
the best approach. She might adopt an approach like weak wel-
farism, which takes into account not only aggregate welfare but 
also other moral concerns.168 Or she might give up on welfarism 
and expected utility theory altogether. These are perfectly rea-
sonable responses. Someone might disagree with her, and then 
they would argue about the advantages of various welfare func-
tions, or whether equality, whether of income or utility, should 
be given weight outside of a welfarist analysis. Again, these are 
reasonable conversations. 
Finally, a welfarist might decide that she will continue to 
act as if everyone has declining marginal utility. This essential-
ly imports the normative into the descriptive but acknowledges 
the normative judgment. The judgment might be that people 
should have declining marginal utility, or that a tax system 
should redistribute only to the less well-off, or that society 
should be more equal. Her bottom line does not change: she 
 
 168. See supra note 27. 
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continues to assume that there is declining marginal utility of 
income, and so she continues to support redistribution in only 
one direction, redistribution that reduces inequality. But the 
conversations that she has will change. She can no longer 
refuse to discuss moral commitments, because she has ac-
knowledged that her assumption of declining marginal utility 
of income is a moral commitment.169 Her results are not incon-
trovertible or unassailable; rather, they are open to challenges 
from those with different moral commitments. In fact, she will 
have the same conversations as the second accommodator, the 
person who chooses equality over nonegalitarian welfarism.170 
And these are conversations worth having. 
  CONCLUSION   
This Article challenges one assumption common to tax le-
gal scholarship’s welfarist approach to analyzing tax policy: 
that income has declining marginal utility. While some evi-
dence supports declining marginal utility, there is also evidence 
that some people have increasing marginal utility over at least 
some range of income. In particular, this Article describes the 
evidence for the Friedman-Savage utility curve, which shows 
locally increasing marginal utility. A welfarist analysis that 
does not give explicit weight to equality always mandates redis-
tribution from those with lower marginal utility to those with 
higher marginal utility. Therefore, if some people do not expe-
rience declining marginal utility of income—for example, if 
 
 169. See, e.g., Blum & Kalven, supra note 8, at 471 (raising the question of 
“whether the minimum sacrifice notion has any persuasiveness independently 
of the frank case for greater economic equality or whether it is merely a cir-
cumlocution for a more obvious position. . . . Would any one who favors pro-
gressive taxation on minimum sacrifice grounds not continue to do so on equa-
litarian grounds if he came to believe that the utility of money was 
constant?”); id. at 485 (“The ostensibly scientific form of sacrifice theory, which 
purports to deal with the way people actually react to money, frequently con-
ceals a normative judgment either about the way that people ought to value 
money or about the social value of typical expenditures at different levels of 
income.”); Dibadj, supra note 18, at 1390 (“Of course economic models . . . are 
useful tools, but at their core [they] rest on value judgments, not meta-
truths. . . . By making economic assumptions explicit, we can debate them 
rather than succumb to the polarization between ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ 
approaches. . . . Inevitably, weasel numbers, just like weasel words, encom-
pass value judgments.”). 
 170. The conversations may be identical, but the models will not be. As 
Louis Kaplow has shown, models differ depending on whether utility curves, 
on the one hand, or social welfare functions, on the other, are assumed to be 
concave. Kaplow, supra note 34, at 38. 
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some people have Friedman-Savage utility curves—such an 
analysis would mandate redistribution from poor to rich, or at 
least from the less wealthy to the more wealthy. 
This Article argues that a welfarist who accepts the evi-
dence that casts doubt on universal declining marginal utility 
has three choices. First, she can accept that tax policy should 
redistribute from some people who are less well-off but have 
declining marginal utility to others who are more well-off and 
have locally increasing marginal utility. Alternatively, if she 
finds poor-to-rich redistribution unpalatable, she could incorpo-
rate equality into her welfarist analysis (for example, by select-
ing another social welfare function) or can soften or reject wel-
farism. Finally, she can acknowledge that just as selecting an 
overall societal welfare function requires a normative judg-
ment, assuming that individual welfare functions exhibit de-
clining marginal utility represents a normative judgment. Such 
a welfarist analysis of tax law would remain valuable, but it 
would also acknowledge that it does not provide a scientific or 
unassailably true answer to the question of how a tax system 
should be structured. 
